PELA'GIANISIII, the doctrinal system of Pelagius (q.v.), especially on the subjects of the natural condition of man. original sin, grace, free-will, and redemption. Under the head PELA.Gius will be found what may be called the external history of the controversy to which the opinions of that remarkable man gave occasion. The movement, cow:M ered in itself, is one of the most interesting in the history of the human mind At the close of the great controversies on the trinity and incarnation, the speculation, which for nearly a century had wearied itself in vain endeavors to make plain the inscrutable mysteries of the divine nature, at length turned inwards upon itself; and no one at all familiar with the controversy on Pelagianism can doubt that that prouder view of the capabilities of human nature, which lies at the root of all the theories of which Pelagian ism was but the exponent, was a reaction against the crude and degrading conceptions of the nature and origin of the soul which characterized the philosophy, not alone of the M michtean teachers, but of all the duallstiC religions which sprung from the prolific soil of Gnosticism. To the Maniehman, and to all in general who adopted the Gnostic views as to the evil origin and nature of matter and material substances, Mitil was, is his psychical nature, evil and incapable of good. The Christian teacher, in combating this view, easily passed into an opposite extreme, and overlooking or explaining away the language of the Scripture, was led to represent man as endowed with 'full capac ity for all good; and so long as the only adversaries to be controverted. were those who. urged the views of the Gnostic school, the line taken by Christian writers was but little guarded by any of those limitations and reserves which have arisen in later controversy; and thus the earlier fathers, especially those of the eastern church, where Gnosticism was chiefly to be combated, are found to press earnestly the power for good which man pos sesses, without entering nicely into the origin or the motive principle of that power. But whatever of vagueness hung over this important subject was dispelled by the bold and precise statements of Pelagius, or at least by the discussion which at once arose thereupon, throughout the entire church. His teaching on the subject of original sin and on the primitive state of man has been already detailed. See ORIGINAL The earli est formal embodiment of these doctrines, for the purpose of obtaining upon them the public judgment of the church, was in a number of articles presented to the council of Jerusalem, in 415, by Orosius. See PELAOTUS. Of these the first five regarded the doc trines already noticed under ORIGINAL SIN. The latter portion of the articles alleged that no grace or aid from God was needed for particular actions, but that free-will and the teaching of the law sufficed; that God's grace is given in proportion to our merits; that free-will would not be free, if it stood in need of aid from God; that the pardon of penitents is not granted according to God's grace and mercy, but according to their own merit and labor; and that our victory does not come from God's assistance, but from our free-will. Although the final sentence condemnatory of these doctrines (see PELA alus) was very generally accepted, yet the recusant party was not wanting in energy and ability. The great champions on each side were Augustine for the orthodox, and Juliantis, bishop of Eclannm, for the Pelagians. Of so much of the controversy as regards original sin, the history has been already related: that on grace and free-will was more subtle, and has led to more numerous divisions on the side of orthodoxy as well as of dissent. In order to evade-the condemnation of the doctrine origivally ascribed to
them as to grace, Pelagius and-his followers declared that they did not deny the neces sity of grace; but by this name they did not understand any real and internal super natural aid given by God in each particular action, but only either some general external assistance, such as preaching, the Scriptures, good example, etc., or an aid given might facilitate and secure the particular work, but which was by no means necessary for its accomplishment. Whether, indeed, they at any time admitted any real internal grace, is a question much disputed. Grace is of two kinds—that which moves the will, and that which enlightens the understanding. It is necessary, too, to distinguish twc periods in the history of Pelagianism—one before the appearance of the Epistolic l'rar toria of pope Zosimus; the other subsequent to that decree. In the first period it would seem that the Pelagians did not admit the necessity 'of any internal grace whatever; in the latter they admitted the necessity of a grace of the intellect, but not of the will; or if they seemed to speak of any internal grace of the will, it was only man's act, not as at all necessary to his doing it. The Pelagian theory, in a word, was, that man, as coming from his Creator's hand, posses-ed in himself, and as constituents of his own nature, all the powers which are necessary for the attainment of salvation; that hy the faithful employment of these natural powers, without any further aid whatever from God, he merits eternal life, and all other rewards, by a strict title of justice; and that, to suppose grace to be necessary, is in truth to destroy the essence of free-will. This doctrine was somewhat modified in the semi-Pelagian system (q.v.). The Catholic schools, all without exception, maintain the necessity of grace for the performance, not only of all meritorious, but of all supernatural good works; and they are equally unani mous in maintaining that the grace so given, even that which is called "efficacious," does not destroy the freedom of the will. They distinguish between the "natural" and "supernatural" order, and between the powers and gifts which are proper to the one and to the other. For the attainment of all the ends of the natural order, man by his very constitution, all the powers and all the gifts which are necessary; and by the proper use of these powers, he is able- to merit all the rewards which belong to the nat ural order. He is able, therefore, without any supernatural grace, to perform morally good works (as acts of natural benevolence, time fulfillment of the ordinary duties to his neighbor, etc.), and to fulfill the purely natural obligations. But in order to works in the supernatural order (such as the love of God above all things for his own sake, faith in him as the author of all good, etc.), and thd rewards which are promised for such works, the will of man must be moved and strengthened by supernatural grace, with which the will freely co-operates, but which is a purely gratuitous gift of God—so purely gratuitous, that although God has promised eternal life as the reward of man's co-operation. yet the merit arises entirely from God's gift and promise, and not from the natural powers of the human will.