REPRESENTATION, in politics, the function of the delegate of a conatitueney in a legislative or other public assembly. The principle of representation, even where not directly recognized, must be presumed to have existed to some extent in all governments not purely democratic, in so far as the sense of the whole nation was considered to be spoken by a part, and the decisions of a part to be binding on the whole. The constitu tion of ecclesiastical councils, in which an express or implied representation is necessarily involved, doubtless conduced to the application of a similar principle to national assem blies; but it is in the exigences of feudalism that we trace the beginnings of an ax n ed and regulated system of political representation. The feudal superior who had tot vy aid from his vassals, summoned a limited number of them to attend him, and miller regarding the required aid. The earliest complete system of representative institutions is to be found in time parliament of the Sicilies under the Swabian kings; but Britain is the only country in which a representative feudal assembly ripened into a legislative. As early as the reign of Henry III. we find the knights of the shire elected by the "men of the country," probably the king's military tenants, to consider, in the stead of each and all of them, what aid would be granted to time king for a proposed expedition into Gas cony. Representatives of the burgesses were soon afterward summoned, and were per manently ingrafted on parliament by Edward I. In Scotland representative burgesses formed a part of the national assembly from the time of Robert Bruce's famous parlia ment at Cambuskenneth in 1326; but down to a comparatively late period the whole barons or freeholders of the country formed part of the king's council, and were entitled to attend in person. A system of representation among them was attempted to be intro duced by James I. on his return from England, but became practically inoperative; and it was not till 1587 that the representatives of the small barons came to form part of the parliament. The progress of society has led to great changes in the constitution of the elective body, the most sweeping being those introdiked by the reform acts. 6ee PARLIAMENT, and REFORM, PARLIAMENTARY.
Am important question naturally arises connected with the subject of representation: Is the delegate the mere mouthpiece of his constituents, who must give effect to ail their opinions and interests, or is it his duty to exercise his trust in the first instance for the general welfare of the nation? The former idea of representation was doubtless the earlier one; but it cannot be easily vindicated on any proper theory of government; and it is now the generally recognized doctrine among English statesmen, that a member of the house of commons is bound to the entire nation by tieshigher than those which bind him to his constituents, and that he ought to support such measures as he judges most beneficial to the country, even at the risk of prejudicing the immediate local interests of the body which scuds him. It is therefore not very easy to reconcile with sound princi
ples the usage which obtains so largely of demanding pledges from candidates for repre sentation as to how they are to vote on every public question that is likely to come before them. Yet there is practically. a difficulty in preventing a system of representa tion from becoming one of mere delegation, so long as the constitution gives to the electors the power of making their vote depend on any conditions which they may think fit to attach to it.
Most speculative politicians of the present day consider a representative government of some description as the best ideal type of government; but all repudiate the idea of an inborn right in all citizens to participate, and still more to participate equally in the right of choosing the governing body. Any very extensive suffrage must of necessity lead to the predominance of mere numbers over intelligence, whiten very limited suffrage has been objected to as doing away with the benefits which the community at large are presumed to draw from a participation in public functions. Several intelligent political writers, while advocating a widely extended suffrage, have proposed a graduationof that suffrage by giving to each individunl.a number of votes corresponding, as far as practi cable, to his intelligence, property, or social position. This is doubtless the perfect ideal of representative government, and the chief question is: By what test can the best approximate estimate of social value be arrived at? Two different schemes for this pur pose have been proposed by Mr. J. S. Mill and prof. Lorimer respectively—the former founded mainly on intelligence as indicated by instruction, and the latter on wealth and social position. The attention of political writers has also lately been directed to the question of the representation of minorities, who at present are not even allowed a hear ing in representative assemblies. The most .feasible scheme for this purpose is perhaps that of Mr. Hare, which had the approval of Mr. J. S, Mill, by which those who do not like the local candidates, are to be allowed to fill up voting papers by a selection from the names of any persons on the list of candidates, with whose general political princi ples they sympathize. This system, along with its other advantages, would, it is sup posed, bring into parliament numerous men of able and independent thought, who, by the present system, refrain from offering themselves, as having no chance of being chosen by the majority of any existing constituency. Sec J. S. Mills Considerations on Representative Government (London, 1801); prof. Lorimer's Political Progress not necessar ily Democratic (1857); and Hare's Treatise on the Election, of Representatives (1860).