The doctrine called the freedom of will may be said to have originated with the Stoics, although with them it was chiefly a rhetorical mode of expressing the dignity of the wise man, and his power of rising superior to circumstances.
To prepare the way for the Stoical precepts, Epictetus distinguished between things in our power and things not in our power. The things in our power are our opinions and notions about objects, and all our affections, desires, and aversions; the things not in our power are our bodies, wealth, honor, rank, authority, etc., and their opposites. The application is this: wealth and high rank may not be in our power, but we have the power to form an idea of these—namely, that they are unimportant, whence the want of them will not grieve us. A still more pointed application is to death, whose force is entirely in the idea.
III. We must consider next the Stoical theory of happiness, or rather of the good, which with them was not identified with happiness. They began by asserting that hap piness is not necessary, and may be dispensed with, and that pain is no evil, which, however, if followed consistently, would dispense wit,h all morality and all human endeavor, Substantially and practically, they held that pains are an evil, but, by a proper discipline, may be triumphed over. They disallowed the direct and ostensible pursuit of pleasure as an end (the point of view of Epicurus), but allured their followers partly by promising them the victory over pain, and partly by certain enjoyments of an elevated cast. that grew out of their plan of life.
Pain of every kind, whether from the casualties of existence, or from the severity of the Stoical virtues, was to be met by a discipline of endurance, a hardening process, which, if persisted in, would succeed in reducing the mind to a state of apathy or indif ference. A great many reflections were suggested in aid of this education. The influ ence of exercise and repetition in adapting the system to any new function, was illustrated by the Olympian combatants, and by the Lacediemonian youth who endured scourging without complaint. Great stress was laid on the instability of pleasure, and the constant liability to accidents; whence we should always be anticipating and adapt ing ourselves to the worst that could happen, so as never to be in a state where anything could ruffle the mind. It was pointed out how much might still be made of the worst
circumstances—poverty, banishment, public odium, sickness, old age—and every con sideration was advanced that could "arm the obdurate breast with stubborn patience, as with triple steel." It has often been remarked that such a discipline of endurance was peculiarly suited to the unsettled condition of the world at the time, when any marl, besides the ordinary evils of life, might in a moment be sent into exile, or sold into slavery. Moreover, it is a discipline adapted to a certain class of dispositions existing in nil ages—the men that prefer above all things " equanimity" of mind, and would rather dispense with great occasional pleasures than risk their state of habitual composure.
Next to the discipline of endurance, we must rank the complacent sentiment of pride. which the Stoic might justly feel in his conquest of himself, and in his lofty independ ence and superiority to the casualties of life. The pride of the Cynic, the Stoic's prede cessor, was prominent and offensive, showing itself in scurrility and contempt toward everybody else; the Stoical pride was a refinement upon this, but was still a grateful sentiment of superiority, which helped to make up for the surrender of indulgeneies. It was usual to bestow the most extravagant laudation on the " wise man," and every Stoic could take this home to the extent that he considered himself as approaching that great ideal.
The last and most elevated form of Stoical happiness was the satisfaction of contem plating the universe and God. Epictetus says that we can discern the providence that rules the world, if we possess two things—the power of seeing all that happens with respect to each thing, and a grateful disposition. The work of Antoninus is full of studies of nature in the devout spirit of "passing from nature to nature's God;" lie is never weary of expressing his thorough contentment with the course of natural events, and his sense of the beauties and fitness of everything. Old age has its grace, and death is the becoming termination. This high strain of exulting contemplation recon ciled him to that completp submission to whatever might befall, which was the essential feature of the "life according to nature." IV. The Stoical theory of virtue is implicated iu their ideas of the good, now de scribed.