Although utilitarians hold that good and evil, right and wrong, are properly deter mined by a calculation of the consequences as regards human happiness, they do not all maintain that past or existing systems of morals have been on all points framed on this principle. Bentham and James Mill appear to have thought that the rule has always been kept in view, though often badly applied. But others, equally earnest iu regard ing it as the only legitimate rule, are of opinion that, in the past and existing ethical precepts, men have been guided partly by utility, and partly by sentiment—that is, liking or disliking for the act itself, irrespective of any further consequences. Thus„ the veneration of the Hindu for the cow, on which ethical duties are founded, is an instance of sentimental liking; the Jewish or Mohammedan prohibition of the pig is a matter of sentimental dislike. In the ceremonial rights of ablution, so widely preva lent, there is a certain show of utility, mixed up with the fancy of cleanliness or purity. In the doctrine of the sacredness of kings, there is a combination of utility and sentiment.
The following are the chief objections to the utilitarian scheme, with the arguments in reply : I. It is maintained that happiness is not, either in fact or in right, the sole aim of human pursuit; that men actually, deliberately, and by conscientious preference, seek other ends. For example, virtue is an end in itself, to be sought whether it yield happi ness or not, and even if it should be productive of the greatest misery. The qualifica tion, however, is always added, that virtue. in the long run, without intending it, and all the more for not intending it, is the unfailing source of happiness.
To which the supporter of utility answers: 1. It is quite true that men seek other ends than immediate happiness to themselves and to others, and that, in particular, they cultivate the virtues as ends in themselves, without always thinking of them as means to happiness. But, then, this is by the operation of a familiar law of the mind, whereby what was originally of the nature of means comes at length to be valued as an end; such is the well-known case of the love of money. The virtues of justice and veracity are essential to human society, just as money represents the basis of subsistence; and by frequent association, the regard that we pay to the end is transferred at last to the means.
2. It may be shown in many ways that the great social virtues derive their worth, in our estimation, from their subservience to human happiness, and not by any absolute title of their own. Take, first, veracity or truth, which, of all the moral duties, has most the appearance of being an absolute and independent requirement. A little con sideration will show that even this is not, in our eyes, an unlimited or unqualified Men have always approved of deception practiced toward an enemy in war, to a mad man, or a highway robber; also secrecy or concealment, even although misinterpreted by others, is generally allowed—unless it leads to some pernicious results; while, if the divulgence of truth were attended with harm, it would be universally reprobated. But
an absolute standard of truth is incompatible even with secrecy or disguise; in departing from the course of perfect openness, or absolute publicity of thought and action, in every possible circumstance, we renounce ideal truth in favor of a compromised, qualified veracity—a following of truth only so far as is expedient.
Again, as regards justice, the presence of considerations of utility is equally obvious. There is no absolute rule of justice that does not bend to circumstances. If justice be defined, giving every one his own or what he is entitled to, there is the show of an abso lute rule: but, in reality, nothing is determined. The meaning is to give to each what law and custom have declared to be a man's own. It is declared just for an elder son to receive a larger share of the parental estate than all the rest of the children put together; but it is clear that whatever justice there is in this must be founded on some ground of expediency. (See on this subject, J. S. Mill's Utilitarianism, chap. v.) II. It is further objected to the adoption of utility as the standard of right, that the full consequences of actions are too numerous, involved, and complicated to be reduced to calculation; and that even where the calculation is possible, people have seldom time to make it.
To this it is answered, first, that the primary moral duties refer to conduct that can be fully calculated to the satisfaction of any reasoning mind. Thus, to revert to the two leading examples, truth and justice: the habitual disregard of these duties would soon bring a society to utter confusion and ruin; without them there could be no social co-operation; man would fall below the condition of the gregarious animals; the race could hardly be saved from extirpation. On the other hand, the observance of these duties, in a high degree, raises to a corresponding degree the means of human happi ness. The balance of advantages is all on one side—there is no case for the other side at all.
There have always been moral rules or enactments where the caldulation of conse quences was much less easy; for. example, the indissolubility of marriage is maintained in some countries and not in others; and there have been considerable differences as to the forbidden degrees of affinity in marriage. In these usages there are both advan tageS and disadvantages, and the preponderance is variously estimated by different cal culators. In such cases the utilitarian would say: Do not make a compulsory enactment restricting liberty, which restriction is an evil in itself, unless the balance of advantages is unquestionable and great.
As to the argument that it is impossible to make the calculation of consequences every time we perform a moral act, the reply is, this is unnecessary; the calculations as to the various duties have been already made, and are embodied in rules, which rules we remember and apply without thinking of the process gone through in arriving at them. The navigator at sea does not need to compute the Nautical Almanac every time he determines his longitude; he carries it to sea with hint ready for use.