TACTICS, MILITARY. Strategy (q.v.) is the art of maneuvering armies with refer ence to the objects of the whole campaign—the securing of communications, the cut ting off an enemy from his base, throwing him into a position where he must fight at a disadvantage, or surrender, etc. Tactics has regard to the evolutions of an army in the actual presence of an enemy. It is the strategy of the battle field; the science of maneuvering and combining those military units which drill, discipline, and the regi mental systeni have brought to the perfection of machines. It was admirably described by Napoleon as the art of being the is, of bringing an overwhelming force to bear on any given point, whatever may be the relative strength of the entire armies opposed.
The earliest records of battles are those of mere single combats, in which the chiefs, fighting either on foot or in chariots, performed great deeds; and the commonalty, who apparently were without discipline, were held in profound contempt. With the growth of democracy arose the organization of the phalanx (q.v.), the advance of which was irresistible; and its firmness equally so, if charged in front. It, however, changed front with great difficulty; was much deranged by broken ground; and failed entirely in a pursuit, or if attacked in flank. Far lighter, and more mobile, was the Roman legion (q.v.). Among Roman tactics was also the admirable intrenchment, which they scarcely ever omitted as an additional source of strength for their position.
"Events reproduce themselves in cyles ;" and with the decay of Roman civilization came again the mail-clad heroes and cavaliers—mounted this time on horses—who mono polized the honors of battle, while the undisciplined footmen had an undue share of the dangers. Later in the feudal period, this disparity between knight and footmen was diminished by the employment of bodies of archers, whose shafts carried distant death. The adoption of gunpowder for small-arms altogether neutralized the superiority of the armored knight. This change brought infantry into the front place in battle, and threw cavalry into the status of an auxiliary. The French revolutionary wars tended much to the development of artillery as a field-weapon, and Napoleon employed this terrible engine to its fullest extent, a practice followed by the best modern generals, who never risk a man where a canon-ball can do the work. Frederick the great was considered
an innovator for fighting with infantry four deep. During the French war, the forma tion of three deep became general, and still obtains in several European armies. Before the battle of Waterloo, the British leaders had acquired sufficient confidence in their troops to marshal them in a double line. It is doubtful whether the advance in arms of precision will not soon necessitate the formation in a single line, or even in a single line in open order.
It is impossible, in an elementary article of this character, to give even an approach to an essay on modern tactics, which is an intricate science. We can only notice briefly a few of the more important principles.
First, as to the art of being the stronger, which is undoubtedly the highest recom mendation in a general, we may cite the example of the battle of Rivoli. • In 1796, Napoleon was besieging Mantua with a small force, while a very much smaller army operated as an army of observation. The Austrian commander had collected at Trent a force powerful enough to crush completely the French army, with which he was march ing south. Parallel with his course lay the lake of Garda, and to prevent the enemy escaping up one side, as lie marched down the other, the Austrian leader divided his army into two powerful corps, and marched one down each side of the lake. The instant .the young French gen. knew of this division, he abandoned the siege of Mantua, collected every available man, and marched against one body of the enemy. Though far inferior on the whole, he was thus superior at the point of attack, and the victory of Rivoli decided virtually the whole campaign. This corresponded in principle with Napoleon's general plan in battle. He formed his attack into column, tried to break through the center of the enemy's line; and if he succeeded, then doubled back to one side, so as to concentrate the whole of his own force against one half of the enemy's, which was usually routed before the other half of the line could come up to the rescue.