Ou the morning of the 18th, the two armies found themselves ranged in battle-array opposite each other: the allies, posted on a line of eminences, had their left wing resting on Frischermont, the farm-house of La Haye Sainte in front of their center, while their right wing curved convexly round behind Hougomont, and rested on Brame Merbes. The French were ranged on a parallel row of eminences, having La Belle Alliance in their center, with some divisions of cavalry and infantry in reserve behind the right. wing; dragoons behind the left wing; and the guard, stationed with the 6th corps, in the rear. Skirmishing had continued all the morning; but the first serious. attack was not made till between eleven and twelve, when a part of the 1st corps advanced against Hougomont, with the view of making the more important attack to be made against the allied left. This preliminary assault, however, though unsuccessful, was maintained with great vigor for a considerable time; till Napoleon, dreading a fur ther loss of time, 'prepared to make his grand attack on the left center. At this time (half-past one P.m.), he learned that the advanced guard of the 4th Prussian corps (Bulow's) was appearing in front of St. Lambert, 2 to 3 m. to his right; and being forced to detach his 6th corps (Lobau's) with the reserves of cavalry behind his right wing, to keep them in check, he had to modify his grand plan of atttack on the Anglo-Nether landers, and accordingly ordered Ney to break through their center. At two P.m., after a furious preliminary cannonade, from which Wellington sheltered his men (as at various other times during the battle),by retiring them to the reverse of the slope, Ney advanced against the left center with 20,000 men, but bad only succeeded in putting 'to flight a Belgian brigade, when lie was attacked and driven back by Picton's division, his retreat inrr columns charged and broken by the English cavalry, and 2,000 prisoners taken. Nevertheless, after a brief space, Ney returned to the charge, and carried La Haye Sainte, though his repeated attacks on the infantry in position were constantly repulsed, and his retreating columns severely handled by the British cavalry, who, disordered by success, were as often overthroWn by the French cuirassiers. By this time (half-past four P.m.), Buldsv had succeeded in deploying from the woods, an& advancing against. Planchenoit, in the rear of the French right, carried it after a vigorous conflict. Lobau's corps, however, aided by a re-enforcement from the guard, speedily re-took the post, and driving the Prussians back into the wood, secured the French right flank for a time; Napoleon, though now learning that another Prussian corps (the 1st, under Ziethen) was coming up by Ohlin to join the allied left, being still confident that he could destroy the Anglo-Netherlanders before the Prussians could render effective aid. During the conflict with Billow, Ney had been warmly engaged with the center and right of the enemy, who had made various attempts to regain the wood of Hougomont and La Have Sainte, and had -upported his repeated attacks with not only his own cavalry, but (by, at any rate, the " tacit consent" of the emperor) with the cuirassiers, lancers, and chas seurs of the guard, and the whole of the mounted reserve, without, however, producing any result other than a great slaughter on both sides, and the useless sacrifice of 18,000 of the finest cavalry ever seen. Napoleon now resolved on another vehement assault on the immovable British center, and directed against it in succession two columns, one composed of four battalions of the middle guard, and the other of four battalions of the middle and two of the old guard, supporting them with flank attacks of other infantry divisions, of cavalry, and with a dreadful fire of artillery. The advancing French were met with a well-sustained fire from every piece which could be brought to bear upon them; the first attacking column was fairly driven down the slope by the English guards, and the second was totally routed by a bayonet-charge of Adams' brigade, the British cavalry following up the fugitives. Ziethen had now (7 r.u.) joined the left of the English line; Bulow, further re-enforced, had carried Planchenoit, and.
was driving the French right wing before him: and the combined attack on the retiring masses of the French by the whole effective force of the Anglo-Netherlanders on the one side, and of the Prussian cavalry on the other, converted an ordinary, though severe defeat into a rout unparalleled in history. The magnificent cavalry, wantonly destroyed
by Ney in fruitless attacks upon an "impracticable' infantry, would then have been of incalculable service, but they were no longer to be had. The last square of the guard still stood its ground, to protect the flight of the emperor; but it was speedily surrounded, and on the soldier-like refusal of Cambronne to surrender, was in a moment pierced through and broken to pieces. From this time all resistance was over; the roads southward, especially that to Genappes, were crowded with fugitives fleeing for their lives from the pursuing cavalry; and though the English light cavalry, exhausted with their severe work airing the battle, soon ceased the pursuit, it was kept up with great energy throughout the whole night by the Prussian troopers, who seemed bent upon at once avenging the defeats of Jena, Auerstadt, and Liguy, and glutted their fierce animosity by an indiscriminate slaughter. The total loss in this battle was, from the obstinacy and determination with which it was contested, necessarily large; the figures are: British and Ilanoverians, 11,678; Brunswickers, 687; Nassauers, 643; Netherlanders, 3,178; a total of 16,186; which added to 6,999 Prussians, gives the aggregate allied loss, 23,185. The French had 18,500 killed and wounded; 7,800 prisoners (some French accounts raise the total list of hors de combat to 32,000), and 227 cannon captured.
This great battle has given rise to numerous controversies among the British, French, and German historians of the great struggle between Europe and Napoleon—the points in dispute being, (1) as usual, the numbers engaged on each side, (2) the ability shown by each general in his dispositions for the conflict, and (3) the relative share of the British and Prussians in producing the final result. These questions can be briefly and satis factorily answered. The strength of the English army is known from official estimates; the French army, as shown by its maneuvers throughout the day, was more numerous, and though its amount cannot, with perfect accuracy, be ascertained, it was certainly over 70,000, and under 80,000; but the fact that many Belgians in the duke's army took to their heels as soon as the French marched toward them, and fled direct to Brussels, increased the disproportion, already sufficiently great, between the two armies; the Prussians had only 35,000 men under fire at Waterloo, and half of these only for about half an hour. Fault has been found with Wellington for giving battle in front of a wood, but the accusation is foolish, as several good roads traversed the wood, thus affording means of retreat, if necessary, and the wood could have been held by skir mishers to protect the retreating infantry. Napoleon's faults were chiefly—the late hour at which he (not calculating on the arrival of the Prussians at all, and certainly not without Grouchy) commenced the conflict, and the reckless manner in which his cavalry reserves were wasted; and his neglecting to take into account the steadiness—a steadiness new to one of even his experience—with which, as he was warned by Soult, who knew it only too well, the British infantry were wont to maintain their ground. As to the third point, there is no doubt that Bulow's attack on Plancbenoit distracted Napoleon's attention, and drew off 10,000 of his forces; but though the Prussians had not come up, the battle could not have been otherwise than a drawn battle; however, the effect of their successful attack on the French right, by taking in flank also the squadrons Which recoiled before the invincible steadiness of the British, was the conversion of an otherwise drawn battle into a glorious victory. Each of the three nations claims its right to give name to this famous conflict—the French calling it after mount St. Jean, a chateau in rear of the British line; the Prussians after La Belle Alliance; while the true victors on the bloody field assert their rightful claim, and will hand it down to all future ages as the battle of Waterloo. See col. Chesney's Waterloo Lectures (1868).