One of the easiest examples is the moving of the head to follow a light or other object pleasing to the gaze. This power is not possessed at the commencement of life, and the process of arriving at it is supposed to be as follows: The child has its eyes fixed on the light, and enjoys the luminous excitement. The light is moved to oneside, and is there fore lost to the direct gaze, and there is no power to recover it. An accidental move ment of the head, occurring by mere spontaneity, carries the eyes round to encounter the light again, or to follow it as it moves; the consecuence is, that the recovered pleas ure of the spectacle sustains the movement that brings it. Now, every such coincidence tends to become fixed, by the law of plastic association; and after a few repetitions of the accidental concurrence, there is &connection formed between the optical impression and the movement that is found to go along with and sustain it. Thus it is, that a movement of the object to the right hand, which leaves a characteristic trace on the visual organ, becomes associated with a movement of the.eyes and the head to the right hand; and whenever the optical fact arises, the movement is apt to follow. This makes one distinct item in our volitional acquisitions; one instance of the power of definitely acting to a definite feeling.
Another example might be taken from the feelings of warmth and chillness—both very powerful sensations in all animals. One of the most obvious means of attaining comfortable warmth is to crouch and bring all the limbs close to the body. A very early experience would connect this posture, accidentally hit upon, with the comfort able sensation; and, by virtue of the primary law of the mind, connecting pleasure with c::alted energy, the movement, once coinciding with the pleasure, would be sustained and adhered to, so long as it brought the pleasure; and in course of a few repetitions, a definite association would be formed between the state of chillness and this mode of relieving it. By a more lengthened and round-about process, more complicated asso ciations would he formed, such as coming close to the warm body of a companion, run ning into shelter, approaching a fire, going into the sunshine, etc.; but, in all cases, the only mode of attainment that can be pointed out, is (1) the concurrence of spontaneous movements with feelings of pleasure, or relief from pain; (2) the maintenance of those movements by the first law of self-conservation; and (3) the forming of a link between the two by the force of plastic association.
The illustration may be varied by viewing the case from the side of pain. The i lump
diate and direct result of pain, from the dawn of sentient life, is to lower active energy for•the time, and therefore to arrest whatever movements are in progress; this is the gen eral rule, although there is an important exception in the case of acute or pungent pains, which, in the first stage, stimulate and excite the active members. Hence, when a move ment happens to coincide with a pain, it is liable to be arrested; a bitter morsel in the mouth makes one cease chewing, by reducing the active power for the moment. The primitive endowment of the system would lead to nothing further, until some chance movement of the mouth tended to get rid of it, which movement would be promoted and sustained by the pleasurable feeling of relief, which is the operation of the princi ple from the other side.
The growth of the will is conspicuously shown in imitation, which is an acquired aptitude, and a department of our voluntary power. In imitation there must be (1) a spontaneous tendency to move the active organs concerned—the voice, the mouth, the hands, etc. ; (2) a sense of the effect, with a certain pleasure in attaining it; and (3) a cementing process, as already described. In learning to speak, the infant must first articulate something of its own accord; the resulting sound affects its own ear, and is discovered to coincide with a sound heard from others. The frequent repetition of the articulate effort leads to its being coupled in the mind with the sound that it gives; and when this association is mature, the sound heard will induce the articulating movement; and this is the power of imitation. But previous to the opportunity of associating the exertion of the mouth, throat, and lungs with the sound emitted, there does not appear to be any capability to imitate articulate sounds. The same would apply to imitation by the hands.
The will in its full development includes not merely a series of associations of move ments with the ordinary pleasures and pains, but also the power of performing actions to the word of command, the imitative faculty just discussed, and the power of acting from a mere wish to perform a certain action, or to produce a certain effect upon things about us—as to open a window or stir the fire. It might be shown that all these various aptitudes grow, by successive stages, out of the three fundamental facts above described. The process involves many struggles•and failures, from there being so much in it depend ing on accidental commencements; hence one reason of the slowness of the early educa tion of human beings.—See Bain on The Emotions and the Will. See also FREE-WILL.