There are circumstances in which it is necessary to dispense with the external form of C., but where its influence still rules. For the convenience of the public—especially of travelers—rates of fares are established for cab-drivers, porters, ferrymen, and the like. These men cannot be forced to undertake such functions: they do so because it pays them. Instead of making a separate contract for each job—an arrangement open to fraud and inconvenience—they make a general bargain with the public to serve all corners. The rate of remuneration they receive ought to be the closest possible approxi mation to what C. would fix. Whether it is so or not, can be easily tested. If men do not come forward in sufficient numbers to serve the public, then the fixed rate is too low; on the other hand, if there is a superfluity of hands, a percentage of them being at all times unemployed, it is clear that the rate is too high, and that even partial employ ment in the line is sufficient to induce men to leave other occupations.
One of the most plausible arguments against free C. is, that it throws away labor by producing more goods than are required. Five hundred hats arc wanted, but a thou sand are produced, and therefore half of them are wasted. In some such shape, the folly and waste of C. are generally illustrated by continental writers. It is very rarely that dealers are so utterly blind to the demand for the article in which they trade. It must be admitted, however, that C.. like all other useful things, has its peculiar abuses, and of these perhaps the chief is the propensity which some tradesmen have to carry rivalry to the extent of vicious excitement, and to endeavor rather to get the better of each other than to make their separate fortunes. From this spirit, it frequently happens
that when one man has established a successful business in some new locality, another, instead of trying a different business in the same place, or the same business in some other and similar place, sets himself down as a rival, and ruins both. One Sets up, for instance, a grocery-shop in a new suburb; he succeeds. but there is not business enough for two; and if a rival sits down beside him, both are ruined; whereas the success of the grocery should rather have hinted that a butchery or a bakery might have a good chance in the same place, or a grocery in some other suburb of similar character. Speculators in omnibuses and other horse-hired vehicles are signally liable to this sort of rivalry, often seeming unable to endure the sight of a brother of the trade driving a good, quiet, tolerably paying business.
C. for public offices—that is to say, the appointment to them of those young men who have shown the highest proofs of ability according to certain tests—lies so recently been adopted, that there is little opportunity of judging of its effects. But it must be kept in view, that this is something quite different judging the kind of C. referred to above. Clever men may be secured to the public service by such a test, but it is clear that the motive for these clever men, as well as other public servants, doing their duty, must be something in the shape of promotion or otherwise, which will have a constant influence on them after they are appointed. See EXAMINATIONS FOR TILE PUBLIC SERVICE.