These, then, arc the features, variously combined in different cases (of which many examples could be easily given), which distinguish instances of D. from ordinary drunkenness, and warrant the opinion that the condition described is a form of mental affection—a disease, like any other insanity. Almost all medical men, we believe, now hold this view, or at least that it should be treated as an insanity; and it has of late been very widely accepted by the general public, at any rate by all, without exception, who have come in contact with instances in their own families or among their friends.
If such, then, is a correct view of the case, it follows that special physical treatment must be adopted before moral and spiritual agencies can be expected to operate with any chance of success; and as the dipsomaniac is incapable of governing his own will, and making any effort to subdue his ruling desire, it is evident that he should be placed under the power of others who have the means of controlling him. From the very nature of the malady, however, it is scarcely to be expected that the inveterate drunk ard will voluntarily submit to control, or continue under it for a sufficient length of time to receive lasting benefit; and therefore it seems essential, as in the case of other insani ties, that legal power, with proper precautions and restrictions, should he available, to secure the possession of his person, and the protection of his property. It is undoubt edly the duty of a good and wise government to provide for such care, when it is so well known that the consequences of unrestrained action may be so serious to the indi vidual chiefly concerned; when families are so often thereby plunged into deep distress or absolute ruin; and when the amenity of society is so frequently outraged by a dis play of mischievous eccentricity, or glaring indecency, or by the occurrence of some flagrant crime. "The liberty of the subject " is a precious trust, but the absence of law to meet the case of the insane drunkard, is in reality license for evil, since no precau tion is taken to prevent most grievous infringements of the liberties of others. , It is certainly an overstrained delicacy in legislation to shirk interference with a class of cases which lead to so much private misery and public expenditure, as the records of our courts of law, prisons, poor-houses, and lunatic asylums can amply attest. But considering the case of the dipsomaniac from another point of view, a facility by law to control, would confer on himself an unspeakable benefit. It would thus afford him his only chance of cure and restoration to society, instead of permitting him to go on to wreck and ruin. Indeed, •he.neglect of law to provide such a check and , seems inconsistent., unjust, and inhumane, when we consider that while it permits the insensate drunkard to endanger his life, to waste his property, and deprive his family of that which they are justly entitled to expect from his hands during life, or to fall to them at his death, it holds him responsible for any criminal act he may commit. No doubt the
law assumes that he drinks voluntarily, and with his eyes open to all the consequences, ' and that his practices therefore form an aggravation of his guilt; but such is Hot the case, for he drinks—as has been shown—involuntarily, and without any reflection as to ultimate consequences; and he is manifestly unable to exercise his reason aright, or gov ern his will. That the existing law of lunacy does not meet the case of insane drinkers, is well known, and much felt. One would imagine that the definition of insanity—" person so diseased and affected in mind as to render him unfit to be at large, either as regards his own personal safety and conduct, or the safety of the persons and property of others or of the public" (20 and 21 Viet. c. 71, s. 3); and again, "a person of unsound mind" (25 and 20 Viet. c. 54, s. 1)—recognizes a dipsomaniac as a fit object for control. But the ancient dicta of English and Scotch judges, as to the nature of insanity, still appear to adhere to the legal mind; and as medical certifiers now require. to state the facts on which they form their opinion, the statement that one or the chief manifestation is excessive intemperance, or an uncontrollable craving for intoxicating liquors, is quite enough to prevent a sheriff—or at least some sheriffs—from granting the wished-for warrant. Ile declines to interfere unless there is evidence of some furiosity in the case, or the existence of a delusion; and in all probability, were he to do otherwise, and the case be carried into court, a deliverance would be given against the plea of insanity. At any rate, the uncertainty in the administration of law in such cases, and the danger of subjection to annoyance and expense, even did they gain their plea. deter medical men from granting certificates, which, otherwise, they would most unhesitatingly do. In the last lunacy amendment net (29 and 30 Viet. c. 51, s. 15, 1866), as permission is,given to the superintendent of any asylum, with assent, in writing, from one of the commis sioners in lunacy, to admit as a boarder any person wishing to submit himself to treat ment—whose mental condition is not such as to warrant certificates of insanity—it was supposed likely to open a door for the admission of dipsomaniacs. But it has only in a very few instances, and for a very brief period of time, been taken advantage of, under the temporary pressure brought to hear on them by friends, etc. Indeed, there is the same difficulty in getting individuals to go voluntarily into private sanatorium, refuges, and boarding-houses for inebriates—Where no legitl-stepS are available—or, when :admit ted, to detain them sufficiently long so as to effeCt a Cure.