Mr. Manse], accordingly, disputes the possibility of our conceiving the infinite, by showing that such a conception passes the limits of human consciousness. The follow ing extract will show his mode of reasoning: "Now, in the first place, the very con ception of consciousness, in whatever mode it may be manifested, necessarily implies. distinction between one object and another. To be conscious, we must be conscious of something; and that something can only be known as that which it is, by distin guished from that which it is not. But distinction is necessarily limitation; forjf One• object is to be distinguished from another, it must possess some form of existence which the other has not, or it must possess some form which the other has. But it'is.obvious that the infinite cannot be distinguished, as such, from the finite, by the absence of any quality which the finite possesses; for such absence would be a limitation. Norrytt can it be distinguished by the presence of an attribute which the finite has not; for, as no finite part can be a constituent of an infinite whole, this differential characteristic must itself be infinite, and must at the same time have nothing in common with the finite. We are thus thrown back upon our former impossibility."—Lecture 3d.
"A second characteristic of consciousness," according to Mr. _Hansel, "is, that it is only possible in the form of a relation. There must be a subject, or person conscious, and an object, or thing of which he is conscious. There can be no consciousness without the union of these two factors; and, in that union, each exists only as it is related to the other. The subject is a subject, only in so far as it is conscious of an object; the object is an object, only in so far as it is apprehended by a subject; and the destruction of either is the destruction of consciousness itself. It is thus manifest that a conscious ness of the absolute is equally self-contradictory with that of the infinite. To be con scious of the absolute as such, we must know that an object which is given in relation to our consciousness, is identical with one which exists in its own nature, out of all relation to consciousness. But to know this identity, we must be able to compare the two together; and such a comparison is itself a contradiction. We are, in fact, required to compare that of which we are conscious, with that of which we are ngt conscious, the comparison itself being an act of consciousness, and only possible threlligh the con sciousness of both objects." The author then lays down a third condition of consciousness—namely, relation to time. Everything conceived by us is conceived as under the two manifestations of suc
cession and duration, from which he endeavors to show "that an act of creation, in the highest sense of the term—that is to say, an absolutely first ]ink in the chain of phenom ena, preceded by no temporal antecedent—is to human thought inconceivable. To represent in thought the first act of the first cause of all things, I must conceive myself as placed in imagination at the point at which temporal succession commences, and as thus conscious of the relation between a phenomenon in time and a phenomenon out of time. But the consciousness of such a relation implies a consciousness of both the related members; to realize which, the mind must be in and out of time at the same moment.
And, further: "Subordinate to the general law of time, to which all consciousness is subject, there are two inferior conditions, to which the two great divisions of con sciousness are severally subject. Our knowledge of body is governed by the condition of space, our knowledge of mind by that of personality. I can conceive no qualities of body save as having a definite local position; and I can conceive no qualities of mind save as modes of a conscious self."—Lecture 3d.
By the application of those four conditions or limitations of human consciousness— distinction, relation, succession, and duration in time, and personality as regards the conception of mind—it is Mr. Mansel's purpose to demolish the foundations of the metaphysical theology of former ages, which was largely conversant with proofs a priori of the infinity and the absolute existence of a Deity. According to him, a rational theology is impossible to be attained. " Our whole consciousness manifests itself as subject to certain limits, which we are unable, in any act of thought, to transgress. That which falls within these limits, as an object of thought, is known to us as relative and finite. The absolute and the &finite are thus, like the inconceivable and the imper ceptible, names indicating. not an object of thought or of consciousness at all, but the mere absence of the conditions under which consciousness is possible. The attempt to construct in thought an object answering to such names, necessarily results in contra diction—a contradition, however, we have ourselves produced by the attempt to think—which exists in the act of thought, but not beyond it—which destroys the con ception as such, but indicates nothing concerning the existence or non-existence of that which we try to conceive. It proves our own impotence, and it proves nothing more."