EJECTMENT, ACTION OF (ejectio firnue), in English law, "is a possessory action, wherein the title to lands and tenements may be tried, and the possession recovered, in all cases where the party claiming title has a right of entry."—Selwyn's Prins. "The action of ejectment," says lord Mansfield, " is the creature of Westminster hall, introduced within time of memory, and molded gradually into a course of practice by rules of the courts."—Fairclaim, & Fowler v. 87tamtitle, 3 Burr. 1292. According to the strict rules of common law, a person dispossessed of his property in land, etc., was obliged to enforce his right by means of one of the forms of real action (q.v.) now abol ished. But as the form of action differed according to the nature of the possession of the holder of the land, this process was tedious and inconvenient. In order to remedy this defect, the action of ejectment was by degrees adopted as a means of establishing a title to land. This action was at first applicable to the special case where the plaintiff was lessee for years, and it was limited originally to a demand for damages simply. But it is said that as early as the reign of Richard II. or Edward IV., the court gave judgment that the plaintiff should also recover the term and the possession of the land. The action having thus acquired in some measure the character of a real action, it was found convenient to extend its effect. By means of a legal fiction, introduced in the time of Henry VII., the action was first applied to the purpose of enforcing a title to land. The process adopted was as follows. The judges having declared that a tenant for years succeeding in his action should have possession, the claimant of the land com menced by feigning a lease for years granted by himself to an imaginary lessee, John Doe. It would seem that at first the plaintiff actually granted a formal lease to a friend, who was also formally ousted, in order to raise the question of title. But these men of straw being removed as the cause proceeded, it was soon found that they might be altogether dispensed with, and the fictitious John Doe and Richard Roe substituted in their room. The declaration proceeded to state that upon this lease Doe entered, and that Richard Roe, also an imaginary person, had ousted him. Notice of this action was then given to the actual tenant of the lands, together with a letter from the imag inary Richard Roe stating that he should make no appearance to the action, and warn ing the tenant to defend his own interest. If no appearance was made, judgment was
given in favor of the plaintiff, who thereupon became entitled to turn out the tenant in possession. But if the latter made appearance, the first step in the action was a formal acknowldgement by him of his possession of the lands, of the lease in favor of Doe, of Doe's entry, and of the ouster by the tenant himself. These matters, be it remem bered, were, in fact, mere fictions; but having been introduced on the record simply to comply with the technical rules of legal title, they were equally readily removed when the real question at issue presented itself. This reduced the cause to the simple ques tion of the right of the plaintiff to grant the lease to Doe, and thus the title to the land became the real question at issue. But it must be observed that this remedy was con fined to the case of one having a right of entry (q.v.). Where, therefore, a person had suffered a deforcement or discontinuance (q.v,), he was still obliged to resort to a rear action to establish his right. This state of things continued till 3 and 4 Will. IV. c. 27, whereby the remedy by ejectment was, with a few exceptions, in fact extended to every one who alleged that lie was wrongfully dispossessed; but it was at the same time pro vided that no action should be brought to recover land but within twenty years after the right accrued. But while the remedy was thus extended, the same elaborate string of fictions was suffered to continue until the passing of the common law procedure act (15 and 16 Vict. c. 76), whereby the ancient machinery is quite swept away. The action now commences by a simple writ addressed to the tenant in possession, and " to all persons entitled to defend the possession," setting forth that the plaintiff has asserted a claim to the land, and calling upon those interested to appear within a certain time to defend their right. The writ also contains a notide that, in default of appearance, the tenant in possession will be ejected. On appearance being made, issue is joined, and the cause proceeds as in ordinary actions. Judgment in ejectment will not carry the mesne profits or rents. In some cases of forcible entry, justices of the peace can also summarily eject the intruder and give possession.