END. This familiar word is concerned in some important discussions, and especial ly in ethics. It is in the sense of "the thing aimed at," the object, purpose, or goal of human action, that we have here to consider it. There is a fundamental contrast between science and art, knowledge and practice. Science, or knowledge, embraces the general order of the universe, and states that order in the form by which we can take in as much as possible in one view; it is the fullest intellectual comprehension of the phenomena of nature that the mind can attain to. Art, or practice, on the other hand, selects and appropriates certain items of knowledge, so as to subserve some useful purpose, some exigency of human life. Thus, agriculture, navigation, law, pol ities, education are all branches of practice; they involve knowledge, but in strict subor dination to their several purposes. The navigator studies astronomy, not with a view to enlighten his understanding as to the mysteries of the solar system and the starry sphere, but with a view to the guidance of his course in the sea. In short, to an art (the word is not here used in the narrow sense of a fine art), or a department of prac tice, belongs in the first place the consideration of the end. Every art has its E., which is its distinction from every other. In most of the arts, the E. is clear and unmistak able; we all know what is expected of a builder, a soldier, or a judge; the only ques tion is how to obtain the knowledge requisite for adequately performing each separate function. But there are some departments where the E. itself is not agreed upon, which casts a peculiar difficulty on the practice. Thus, it was remarked under Crv wrzAriox, that the E. of the whole mechanism of human society, including politics, etc., is differently viewed by different minds. But it is in the one special department
of morality that the consideration of the E. is of most vital consequence. This fea ture of the ethical problem has been very little adverted to in modern discussions, while the ancient philosophers kept it more prominently before them. Aristotle begins his Ethics by remarking that every art aims at some good; most arts, as medi cine, ship-building, generalship, having limited or partial ends; while some comprehend much wider ends than others. The largest E. of all is the good of mankind collect ively. Hence he goes on to inquire what is the highest good of man. and finds that happiness is neither pleasure, nor honor, nor virtue (by itself), nor wealth, but that it is "au energy of the soul according to virtue;" activity, in opposition to oriental notions of luxurious repose, being an essential in his eyes. He has next, therefore, to inquire what "virtue" is, according to which a man must employ his activity—a ques tion of no easy solution. Still, the discussion brings out the one fact, that morality is a branch of practice, but unlike most arts in this, that the E. is peculiarly difficult to determine precisely. Accordingly, it is necessary to have in connection with it a set of discussions, called by Mr. J. S. Mill (Logic, concluding chapter) teleology, or the doc trine of ends, corresponding to what the German metaphysicians have termed the prin ciples of practical reason. The various theories of moral obligation differ in their statement of the E. of morality; according to one, it is the self-interest of the indi vidual; according to another, the interest of mankind on the whole. The most preva lent theory is the harmonizing with a certain inward sentiment called the moral sense. See ETHICS.