FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW. Slaves being regarded as property, thing; and not per sons, as the Roman law puts it, the existence in every state in which slavery exists of a law recognizing the right of the master to reclaim his property follows as a logical con sequence. Accordingly, the-constitution of the United States of America having nized slavery, or "service," as it was gently termed by American writers, necessarily used to contain a number of enactments for its enforcement. By art. 4, s. 2 of that document, it was declared that persons held to service or labor in one state, under the laws thereof, and escaping into another, should be delivered up, on claim of the party to whom such service or labor might be due. In furtherance of this provision, the laws of New York the arrest of such fugitives, ou habeas corpus, founded on due proof, and for a certificate in favor of the right of the claimant, and delivery of the fugitive to him, to be removed. This obsolete law, as narrated in the latest edition of Kent, seems to have been to the following purport: The act of 1793, providing for the reclamation of fugitives from justice and from service, had, so far as relates to the lat ter, been amended, and to a considerable extent superseded, by the act of Sept. 18, 1850. The judicial duties imposed by the latter act were to be performed by the U. S. com missioners, win; might have the power of arresuing or imprisoning for offenses against the United States, by the judges of the circuit and district courts of the United States, and of the superior courts of territories, and by such special commissioners as the respective courts might appoint. It was. the duty of all U. S. marshals to obey and execute all warrants and process of such judges and commissioners; and after the arrest of any fugitives, such officers were liable for an escape with or without their assent. . When any fugitive escaped into another state or territory, the owner, or his
duly authorized agent, might pursue and personally arrest said fugitive, or Might demand a warrant and arrest from the officer having due authority. The fugitive was then to be taken before a commissioner or judge, whose dutx, it- was to hear and determine the complaint in a summary manner. Should he have been satisfied of the validity of the claim and the identity of the slave, it was his duty to deliver to the claimant a certifi cate of the proceeding had, with authority to remove the fugitive to the place from which he fled. The testimony of the fugitive was not admissible. Any assistance ren dered to a fugitive to enable him to escape from the claimant. or any obstruction offered to his arrest, was penal, and also subjected' the party to damages at the suit of the owner. All citizens of the United States were required, when called upon, to render the officers personal assistance in the performance of their duties. These provisions applied to all the states previously to the war, whether slavery was recognized by their special laws or not; the principle being, that " the constitution and laws of the United States secure the right to reclaim fugitive slaves against state legislation." In some of the slave-holding states it was held that, if a slave from such a state went lawfully into a non-slave-holding state, and acquired a domicile there with his master, or was emanci• pated there, he became emancipated, and ceased to be a slave on his return; but if he were carried there for a temporary purpose, and returned, his state of slavery was resumed. These provisions did not apply to the fugitive slave (Kent, ut sup. ii. p. 207.)