With this idealism began a kind of revolutionary excitement in the minds of Germans which contrasted strongly with the calm and sober spirit of Kant. System followed system; philosophical books appeared in shoals; and for a quarter of a century and more the interest was shared'by the public in general. But meteors that appeared in the philosophical sky of Germany vanished, for the most part, as sud denly as they had blazed. forth. Schelling was the first that attained a general influ ence. F. H. Jacobi had previously recalled attention to Spinosa, and Schelling, influenced by the speculations of Spinosa, converted the idealism of Fichte into what is called "the philosophy of identity." This system set out originally with the asser tion, that as Fichte educes nature out of the ego, so, by an inverse process, the ego may be educed out of nature; but that both these forms of philosophizing have their ground in the absolute as She identity of all opposites—of the real and the ideal, of subject and object. of mind and matter. In carrying out this assertion, Schelling fixed upon intel lectual intuition as the kind of cognition alone corresponding to the absolute, or rather, as identical with and representing the absolute. The organ of this intuition was called reason, and, as such, was opposed to the reflection of the understanding, which was held to be quite incapable of taking cognition of the absolute. The relation of the phenomenal world to the absolute was held to consist in this, that the absolute repre sents itself in the multiplicity of appearances, steps out of the state of "indifference" into that of "difference," manifests itself in "difference," etc. Taking special cases, particularly in natural philosophy, Schelling endeavored to demonstrate the existence of this identity in the midk of non-identity, and of non-identity in the midst of identity. In this attempt, however, neither Schelling nor his disciples effected much. For in undervaluing and neglecting experience and reflection, the door was opened to a fanci ful mode of speculation, which in most cases had little More in common with science than the name; so that in the departments of poetry, religion, and social life, the Schelling philosophy often degenerated unto a blind groping, leading to the strangest aberrations of romanticism, mysticism, and tendency to Catholicism.
The philosophy of IIegel (q.v.) took the same general direction as that of Fichte and Schelling. Hegel attempted to develop, in regular organization, the contents of the intellectual intuition (in plain words, the cognitions and ideas of the mind) by the dialectic or logical method. Though he broke loose from the prevalent fashion of indulging in art unbridled play of fanciful combinations, he did not content himself with the rules of logic recognized for thousands of years, but sought an expression for speculative thought. in a dialectic of his own. The essence of this transcendental logic
consisted in the analysis of all the established general conceptions; and the process or method consists in making each conception of itself generate its opposite, and, combin ing with this opposite. thus become enriched and enabled to advance to still higher stages. This method Hegel, with enduring perseverance, endeavored to carry out through the whole field of philosophy; and divided his system into the three provinces of logic, philosophy of nature, and philosophy of mind.
While the systems above considered form pretty much a•continuous line of progress. that of J. F. Herbert (q.v.), on the contrary, arose in opposition to the idealism of Fichte, and took a direction in complete antagonism to the dominant philosophy. The well-nigh innumerable productions of other thinkers in this department, though 'often of individual merit, are only of secondary importance for the development of philosophy as a whole. None of them opened up any new leading path; they are occupied chiefly in defending or remodelling older systems, and applying them to particular departments of science, or in controversy with the dominant philosophy of the day. To this category belong the Kantian systems of Krug and others, the physical speculations of Steffens,' Oken, Schubert, etc.; the various attempts to lead back philosophy to empirical psychology; the peculiar speculative attempts of Schleiermacher, J. J. Wagner, Fichte the A. Trendelenburg, etc.; the different tendencies within the Hegelian school; and lastly, the position which Sahelling latterly took up. The philosophy of Schopenhaucr (q.v.) has had a peculiar fortune. Long known to but a very limited circle, it has, during the past twenty years, largely occupied attention, and has done more to reawaken an interest in philosophical speculation than any other system.
While philosophy during the last half century was thus actively prosecuted as a science, a corresponding interest was taken in its history; in fact, it was Germans who first sought to grapple with the history of philosophy as a whole, and to throw light upon the principal departments of it by valuable special treatises. See PHILOSOPHY. The rapid succession of systems, one after another, and the extravagancies into which seine of them ran, have, it is true, produced a lull in the interest taken in speculation; and to the former enthusiasm there soon succeeded a skeptical aversion to all specula tive inquiry. Still the influence that philosophy has had in elevating and strengthening the scientific mind of Germany, has been powerful and beneficial; and there are few departments of research in which the fruits of the philosophic spirit may not be seen in a deeper and more thorough mode of treatment.