The husband, being entire master of his own actions, has the power to decide where to live, and the duty of the wife is to live with him in the same house. If she refuses to do so, and lives apart without just cause, he is not bound to support her even with necessaries. If, however, she separates from him for just cause, the case is otherwise. ' Though the husband is bound to maintain his wife, there is. curiously enough, no direct means in England of enforcing this duty. There are circuitous means only. The wife, for example, cannot sue the husband herself, but she has an implied authority to order necessaries, and the tradesman so supplying these can sue the husband for the price. Hence it is that when a tradesman supplies a wife, who is living apart, with necessaries, before he can be sure of recovering the price from the husband, lie must satisfy himself that the wife has just cause for living separately. There are several just causes for her living apart. If the husband, for example, treats her with what is deemed cruelty in tke eye of the keepinga•mistress in the house,'StarVing and assaulting her—she . .
is entitled to leave him, and she can order necessaries at his expense from any trades. man willing to supply- her. There are, however, many degrees of cruelty and ill-usage for which the wife has practically no remedy, and of which the law can take no cogniz ance; for the law cannot remedy a tithe of the ills of life. If the husband have the means, and yet refuses to support his wife, or what is the same thing, if he willfully refuses to work, being able to do so, and she becomes chargeable to the parish, the parish authorities can seize the goods of the husband, if any, and sell them for her sup port; or he may be imprisoned by justices of the peace, as an idle and disorderly person, for a month. But in such circumstances the husband more frequently deserts his wife. If he deserts her, and leaves her destitute, and a charge upon the parish, he may then be treated under the vagrant act as a Pogue and vagabond, and imprisoned by justices of the peace in the house of correction for three mouths. If the desertion continue for a period however long, it is no ground In England for a divorce; but if it is coupled with adultery, and continues two years, it will be so. It sometimes happens that after a husband has deserted his wife, she maintains herself by her own exertions, and acquires property; in such a case, her earnings (unless the marriage took place after 1870) belong to him, though the wife might in all cases get a protection order from justices of the peace, which excludes him and his creditors. Stats. 20 and 21 Viet. c. 65, sec. 21; 21 and 22 Vict. c. 108, sec. 6, 7, 8; 33 and 34 Vict. c. 03, sec. 1.
As regards crimes committed by a wife, she is in general liable to be punished for these in the same way as if she were unmarried. But there is a peculiarity as regards ,rimes committed by the husband and wife jointly. If the crime be treason or murder,
both are punished precisely as if they were unmarried. But in all the lesser crimes, the theory as well as the practice is, that if the wife was a party to the crime, and com laitted it in her husband's presence, she is presumed by the law to have so acted under the compulsion or coercion of her husband, and is acquitted as a matter of course. And so favorable is the law on this ground to married women who commit crimes, that, in the absence of any direct evidence one way or the other as to where the crime was com mitted, it will still be presumed that the wife acted under this marital coercion, and so she escapes punishment. Another curious anomaly arising from the maxim that hus band and wife are one person, is, that a wife cannot be convicted of stealing her hus band's goods. If she abscond with his property, however valuable, she cannot be punished. But this rule is again qualified by the circumstance, that if she mullahs adultery, and afterwards absconds with the adulterer, both taking away the husband's goods, the adulterer may be convicted of the larceny, though it is doubtful if she is in that case liable to any punishment. And where the third party has not in view any adultery with the wife, but joins her in taking away the husband's goods, in many cases neither he nor the wife can be punished criminally.
Husbands and wives may be witnesses for or against other parties in all civil cases, i.e., actions and suits relating to debts, contracts, and wrongs which are not crimes, and in all inquiries of a civil nature. So when the husband is himself a party in a civil action, his wife may be compelled by the opposite party to he a witness; but in all such cases neither husband nor wife can be compelled to disclose any communication made to him or her by the other spouse during the marriage. As regards all criminal proceedings instituted against either husband or wife, the other spouse is neither com petent nor can be compelled to be a witness; but where the husband and wife are not the accused, but the prosecuting parties, then, inasmuch as the crown is presumed to be the prosecutor, and they are not parties, they may be both witnesses, subject to the qualification as to not bound to disclose communications made by and to each other during marriage. There is an exception also to the rule that neither can be a wit ness against the other in criminal proceedings—viz., where the wife charges her husband with an assault or other crime of greater degree upon her person, she is in that case only a competent witness against him, for otherwise the crime might go unpunished. Moreover, in all proceedings instituted in consequence of adultery of the husband or wife, neither of the married parties is competent or can be compelled to be a witness.