MIND. Having adverted in various other articles—EmonoN, LsTELLEcx, WELL, etc. —to'the chief component parts of our mental constitution, all that is necessary- under the present head is to consider the definition or precise demarkation of mind as a whole. In this subject we cannot resort to the common method of defining:which is to assign something more simple and fundamental than the thing to be defined; as when we define gravity to be an attractive force, the notions of force and attraction being supposed to be more intelligible than gravity. Mind can be resolved into nothing more fundamental than itself ; and therefore our plan must be to call attention to those individual facts or expe riences that are pointed at by the name, and to circumscribe, in some way or other, the whole field of such experiences. For an example of mind, we should probably refer each person to his pleasures and pains, which are a class of things quite apart and peculiar ; we should also indicate thoughts or ideas as mental elements; also exercises of will or voluntary action. There is a sufficient community of natum in those various elements to cause them to be classed by themselves under a common designation, namely, mind. If any one could be made aware of all the phenomena that have received this designation. he would, of course, know the meaning in the detail; but this is not enough. 3Iind being a general or comprehensive name, we ought to see distinctly the common char acter or attribute pervading all those particular phenomena; the recognition of this com mon character is the knowledge of mind in general, or the determination of its defining attribute. For the settling of this common attribute we have another great resource, besides comparing the individual facts, that is, to determine the opposite, or contrast of mind. Now, the trually assigned contrast is matter; but more precisely, it is extension,
or the extended, including both inert matter and empty space. When we are conscious of anything as having the property of extension, our consciousness is occupied with the object world, or something that is not mind. When we are feeling pleasure or pain, remembering or willing, we are not conscious of any.thing extended; we are said to be in a state of subjective consciousness, or to be exhibiting a phenomenon of mind proper. Hence, philosophers are accustomed to speak of the znextended mind, as distinguished from the outer or object world. In one. sense everythinm that we can take cognizance of is mind or self; we cannot by any possibility transcendsour own mental sphere; what ever we know is our own mind; hence the idealism of Berkeley, which seemed to annihilate the whole external universe. But this large sense of mind is ndt what is usually meant, and whatever view we take of the reality of the external world, we must never merge the distinction between the consciousness of the extended—which is also coupled with other truly object properties, as inertia, for matter—and the consciousness of the inex tended, as constituting our feelings and thoughts. This opposition is fundamental and inerasable, and is expressed in language by a variety of designations—niind and not mind, subject and object, internal and external., The laws and phenomena of the extended are set forth in the sciences of the external world—mathematics, mechanics, chemistry, etc.; the laws of the mind proper, or the subject consciousness, are quite distinct in their nature, and are embodied in a separate science, called mental philosophy, psychology, etc.