This crisis came, perhaps, at the proper moment, since it was necessary to shape the public sentiment in proper form for the great results which were to follow. It left us poor,—our factories closed, our manufacturers ruined, our experts scattered; but it taught our people wisdom, and prepared their minds for the advent of the slaveholders' rebellion,—though their pockets and their means of defence were sadly deficient in con sequence. In 1860-61 came a change in political parties and political economy. "Pro tection to our manufactures was accepted as protection to our farmers," and adopted as a plank in the Republican Platform.
"Better reform late than never." But let us see how great the emergency, how necessary the change from free trade to something like protection, and how illy prepared we were, in consequence of ten years of the "crushing-out" process, to meet the gigantic demands which the war so suddenly forced upon us,—how indispensable those manufac tures which we refused to protect in peace were to our protection in war.
In 1849 and 1850, the quantity of English railroad iron rushed into American markets were 200,000 tons, at $40 per ton, to which low price we had forced it during our season of protection. Our mills, which produced 41,000 tons annually, and were then capable of producing 70,000 tons, were reduced to 16,500 tons average during these years.
The furnaces went out of blast, because the market for pig-iron was destroyed by the stopping of the mills. Under these circumstances, in order to save themselves from actual ruin, our manufacturers asked simply for protection against actual loss, or enough to allow them $50 per ton for iron which was one-third more valuable than English iron; but Congress refused to help them; they permitted our foreign rivals to crush out competition. Our productions fell from 800,000 tons of pig-iron per annum
to less than 500,000 tons, instead of increasing as formerly. England then stepped in for our trade, and before competition could be again restored, the price of iron went up from $40 to $80 per ton! At enormous prices, England supplied us with no less than 1,000,000 tons of rails in the four years 1851-54.
The additional price paid during those four years by our railroad companies as a penalty for permitting American competition to be crushed out, could not be less than $30,000,000, which went into British pockets. This crushing-out process culminated with the crisis of 1857, and left our factories closed, our workshops idle, our furnaces out of blast, our mills deserted, our exports scattered, our capital sunk, our credit de stroyed, our iron industry crippled, and the munitions of war consequently unavailable.
This was our condition on the breaking out of the rebellion, though we had been for a whole decade in possession of mines of treasure that yielded us more than $500,000,000! all of which had gone to Europe, without enabling us to pay our way, or make up for the annual loss of our free-trade experiment; while we owed not less than $500,000,000 in addition to English or European capitalists, on which we could scarcely pay the inte rest, and our credit was so low that our bonds found no further purchasers. So much for free trade! These are its lessons. Will we never profit by our sad experience?