UTILITARIANISM, that theory of life which represents happiness as the only ultimate end to be devised and sought after—not necessarily the happi ness of the individual, but that of the human race as a totality, and "even as far as possible of the sentient crea tion"—in Bentham's phrase "the great est number." With Jeremy Bentham, the inventor of the term the "greatest happiness of the greatest number," as the end of all true moral action, Utilitarianism takes its more modern shape. "Nature," he said, "has placed mankind under the govern ment of two sovereign masters, Pain and Pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do." In J. S. Mill Util itarianism assumes its present, which may be safely said to be its highest, form. There, the happiness of the race is announced as an end to be pursued by the individual, even though he should be obliged to renounce his own in its attain ment. A place is found for the mar tyr's effort, but that effort must be in accordance with the great principle of Utilitarianism, or it is worse than use less. Moreover, happiness is here no low or degrading conception, for there is quality as well as quantity in pleasures, and a lower pleasure must yield to a higher—the senses to the intellect, the body to the mind. Those who have had experienced of both may be taken as judges of the question. They have uni formly given the palm to the higher pleasures, and from their decision "I ap prehend there can be no appeal." By careful moral education the conscience of the individual is to be so developed that its force in the direction of right action will be all-powerful.
That Utilitarianism is a theory of great plausibility, and that it can urge a great deal in support of its position, is evident from the preceding historical sketch. It is, so to speak, a self-contained theory; it does not require to go beyond the ob vious facts of existence to support its claims; it is plain, simple, and direct; it affords an easy and safe rule for the solution of all disputed questions of r'orals; and it is in obvious agreement with a vast number of the most patent facts of life. Many arguments have been employed against Utilitarianism. It has been urged: (1) That our powers have various ends, how then can hap piness be the end of them all? (2) That all actions producing happiness are not regarded as moral actions. All actions producing pain are not wrong actions. (3) That pain may be used as a means to good, but we must not do evil that good may come of it. (4) That we cannot always calculate beforehand whether the effects of an action will be good or bad. Human life is too complex, and the knowledge an individual has of it is too small to allow him to judge with perfect certainty. Besides, men will take different views of such questions, and thus the moral standard will at best be but a fluctuating one. These objections have been more or less effectively met by the advocates of Utilitarianism, but the gravest objection to the doctrine is (5) that it has no proper theory of duty— the word "right" has no deep true mean ing in the system.