Kiao-Chau, an important seaport in the province of Shantung, together with im portant mining and railway concessions, had been extorted from China by Ger many in 1897. In 1914, shortly after the beginning of the World War, Kiao-Chau was captured mainly by Japanese forces, though British naval forces co-operated in its capture. Germany had been ousted from that section of the world, and Japan remained in undisturbed possession until the close of the war. An agreement was made in 1915 between China and Japan, in which the former agreed in advance to any arrangement that might ultimately be made by Japan with Germany regard ing the disposition of the territory. Japan it the same time promised that in re „urn for certain important concessions, she would eventually restore Kiao-Chau to China. Before the Peace Conference, Japan urged that what she had taken from Germany in actual fighting ought to remain hers by right of conquest, though she still adhered to her promise to restore the territory eventually to China. This was vague and unsatis factory, for Japan refused to specify a date for the return. She might make it one year or a hundred, as she chose. China's contention was that her entrance into the war against Germany, even at a late date, abrogated any treaty that she had with the vanquished power and that therefore Kiao-Chau reverted to her automatically, and that the railway and mining concessions were likewise abrogated. So strongly did she feel on the subject that her delegates asserted that they had received instructions from their government not to sign the treaty, if their claims were not granted.
Had the matter been open to free and fair debate, the decision of the conference on the conflicting claims might have been different. But it soon developed that the Allied powers were pledged in advance to support the claims of Japan. It was wholly unknown to the American dele gates that a treaty had been entered into in 1917, between Japan and Great Britain, Russia, France, and Italy, by which the four latter Powers agreed to support Japan's claims at the Conference in reference to Shantung, in return for Japan's undertaking to permit China to enter the war. The existence of this
secret treaty was only revealed in an swer to a casual question of President Wilson. Under these conditions, it was a foregone conclusion that the decision would go against China. It was officially announded, on April 30, 1919, that the Shantung Peninsula and Kiao-Chau were to be given without reserve to Japan, who in turn was to withdraw her mili tary forces and ultimately return to China full sovereignty over the dis puted territory. The point was made that instead of doing this at the summary command of the Peace Conference, Japan should do it in her own way and at her own time as a free agent. No date was specified, as Japan objected to this as a reflection on her good faith. Besides the railroad and other concessions that she held as the legatee of Germany, Japan was to be allowed to establish a settle ment at Tsing-tao, south of Kiao-Chau.
The decision aroused great resentment among the Chinese delegates. They cabled to Peking for instructions and were told not to sign the treaty, the intimation being given that if they did, their lives would not be safe on their return to China. Excitement and dis orders broke out in Chinese cities and protests poured in from Chinese com munities and associations all over the world. A special additional commission was sent to Paris to urge the Conference to reconsider its decision. Members of the commission expressed the conviction that if Japan controlled the rich Shan tung province, with what was considered the best seaport of the Republic, slug would soon dominate northern China gradually extend her control to southern China, and then, when she felt strong enough, proclaim a Monroe Doctrine of the Orient. Protests were unavailing, however, and the decision stood. China refused to sign the treaty.