IES INTO THE FIELD NEW YORK) Without having first obtained the permis sion of the commission, no corporation shall begin the construction of a street railroad, or exercise any franchise or right under any pro vision of the railroad law. The commission shall grant its approval, whenever it shall, after due hearing, determine that such con struction or such exercise of the franchise or privilege is necessary for the public service. The provision concerning gas and electrical companies is substantially the same.
Decisions of the commission have done little toward formulating a definite policy, to be followed in acting on applications for the exercise of franchise rights and other powers mentioned in clauses of the act re lating to the admission of companies into a new field. It has, however, come out flatly in defining its position as to the admission of new companies into a field already satisfac torily supplied: "If additional companies are allowed to enter a field already adequately supplied, the public in the end must pay higher rates or accept poorer service." In the case of the application of the Longacre Elec tric Light and Power Company, in 1908, the commission stated its views at length. This company petitioned for the approval of a proposed bond-issue. Since the proceeds from the sale of the bonds were to be used to build a plant, the request amounted to an application to begin business. The board denied it.
_ The applicant did not prove that the exist ing companies were not properly serving the public interest and convenience, and that it would be to the public advantage to have a new company authorized to enter the field.
If a competing company were to enter the field, it was unlikely that it would continue independent operation for any length of time.
Competition was not desirable, the board said. The existence of competing companies leads to much more frequent opening of the streets, resulting in injury to pavements and more expense to the taxpayers. Competition involves duplication of plant and equipment. It is an established fact that one company can generate current for the whole of Manhattan more cheaply than several companies, each trying to serve the entire borough. As a re sult of duplication of capital and the less economical methods of production and dis tribution which accompany competition, the cost of furnishing current is higher than under efficient monopoly. Furthermore the exist ence of duplicate plants and wires is almost always urged as a reason for higher charges when the state attempts to lower rates. Practically all the advantages claimed as the probable result of competition can be secured through the powers of the commission. Until it has been demonstrated that these are inef fective, it would be unwise to adopt a method which has proven ineffective in the past.