This view, which is that of materialism, while it necessarily tends to destroy our hopes of a future life, by denying even the very ex istence of a Soul, and not its immortality only, is opposed by the consciousness which we possess of a power inherent in the mind to direct and control -the actions of the brain, and by the knowledge that the mind will rise supe rior to the fatigue and exhaustion of the body, and will survive, unimpaired, even its wreck.
There are, moreover, some excellent persons, who, while they admit the existence of an immortal soul distinct from the mind, never theless regard the phenomena of the mind as functions of the brain, resulting from the changes which are continually taking place in that organ. The tnind, they say, is " the ag gregate of the functions of the brain," and is entirely .dependent on its integrity. But the adoption of these views involves the advocate of them in as great a difficulty as that from which he flatters himself he has escaped. If there be a soul, what is its relation to the mind ? What is its office? Is it simply asso ciated with the body without being affected by it or affecting it in turn ? Surely it must have some office, and if it be admitted to be capable of exercising any influence, either on the mind or on the body, then the vvhole matter in dis pute vanishes. If the soul can affect the mind, it must do so acconiing to these views through the body; and,if this be admitted, why make a difficulty about admitting that the will, as a faculty of the soul, can influence some portion of the brain ? On the other hand, if it be denied that the soul can affect either mind or body, then ,must we come to the conclusion that the soul is inert, or else an entity totally distinct from the body, a looker-on as it were, which watches the corporeal functions and the mental pheno mena, but takes no part in them, and has no true sympathy with them.* An acute and ingenious writer, Dr. Wigan, who has advocated with great zeal and ability the docrine of the duality of the mind, seems to think that the prog,ress of mental philosophy and of cerebral physiology is rnuch hindered by the views of those who advocate the spiritual nature of the mind.° But no doubt his fears are unfounded ; for if we hold that a connec tion subsists between soul and brain so intimate that every change in either affects the other more or less, surely the strongest inducement is held out for the minutest investigation of the org,an which can exercise so wonderful an influence on the immortal part of our nature.
I would, then, lay it down that the proper function of the brain is to generate the nervous force, and that that force affects the soul and excites its action for the developernent of mental phenomena. On the other hand, the action of the soul affects the brain, exciting it to the de velopement of nervous force, and directing that force for the production or regulation of other corporeal phenomena.
Taking this view of the nature of the mind, and of the relation of mind and body, we may, with advantage, arrange the principal mental states into two classes, according as they are preceded by certain states of body, or as they precede and are capable of exciting certain states of body.
In the first class I would place sensation, and such mental suues as are immediately asso ciated with or produced by sensation, as the emotions and the passions. To this class I woukl likewise refer that peculiar power vrhich is, with the highest probability, exercised by the cerebellum, and to which we must give the name of balancing or coordinating power. It is a power which, like the emotions and passions, is exercised without any previous train of thought or intellectual process, and seems sim ply to be evolved as an immediate cousequence of certain sensations, which are developed un der the influence of impressions made upon the organs which are to be submitted to its regulation. Thus, in locomotion, the exercise of the muscles produces the sensation upon which the evolution of this mental power de pends, vrhich reacts upon the same muscles with an intensity proportionate to the exciting impulse. In the exercise of this power there is much analogy with the ordinary reflex acts; but while the latter are purely physical in their nature, the former rnay be clearly shown to be rnental. The proofs of this are derived, 1, from its being never accomplished svithout conscious ness; 2, from its being always associated with volition ; 3, from the curious differences in the mode of its exercise in different iudividuals, according to differences of mental and physical constitution, one man being expert and precise in all his movements, another awkward and clumsy; 4, from the marked improvement which may be effected in it by in.struction autl duly regulated practice.