In addition to this, which may be regarded as the central point of Philo's system, some have en deavoured to elicit from his writings a closer ap proximation to Christian doctrine, in the recognition of a third divine being, distinct both from the su preme God and from the Logos. ill A remarkable passage sometimes cited for this purpose occurs in his allegorizing commentary on the cherubim and the flaming sword placed in Eden. With the one truly existent God,' he says, there are two first and highest powers, goodness and authority : by goodness he has produced everything, and by au thority he rules over that which he has produced ; and a third, which brings both together as a me dium, is reason ; for by reason God is both a ruler and good. Of these two powers—authority and goodness—the cherubim are the symbol ; and of reason, the flaming In like manner he comments on the threefold appearance to Abraham in the plains of Mamre : The middle appearance represents the Father of the universe, who in the sacred writings is called by his proper name, the Existent (6 'Be), and those on each side are the most ancient powers and nearest to the Existent ; one of which is called the creative and the other the kingly power. And the creative power is God, for by this power he made and arranged the universe ; and the kingly power is Lord, for it is meet that the Creator should rule over and govern the crea ture.'* The inference, however, which has been drawn from these and similar passages rests on a very precarious foundation. There is no consist ency in Philo's exposition, either as regards the number or the nature of these divine powers. Even granting the disputed opinion that the powers re present distinct personal beings, we find in one of the above passages the three beings all distinguished from the supreme God : while in the other he seems to be identified with one of them ; and the confu sion is increased if we compare other passages in which additional powers are mentioned with further distinctions.t The truth seems to be that Philo indulged his allegorizing fancy in the invention of divine powers ad libitum, in any number and with any signification which the text on which he was commenting for the moment might happen to sug gest ; and he has no more difficulty in finding six divine powers to be represented by the six cities of refuge than he has in finding three to suit the two cherubim and the flaming sword. In this kind of desultory playing with the language of Scripture, it is idle to look for any definite doctrine, philo sophical or theological.
It must not be supposed that the doctrines here attributed to Philo are clearly and unambiguously enunciated in his writings. Many passages might be quoted apparently indicating different views ; and probably no consecutive summary of doctrines could be drawn up, against which similar objec tions might not be urged. This difficulty is un avoidable in the case of a writer like Philo, who attempts to combine together two antagonistic systems, of whose antagonism he is himself but imperfectly, if at all, conscious. Philo's system has been called an eclecticism ; but it was not so much an eclecticism founded on definite principles of selection, as an accumulation of speculations which he was unable to combine into a consistent whole, though persuaded of the existence of a com mon principle of truth concealed under them. There is a perpetual struggle between the Jewish and the heathen, the religious and the philosophi cal elements of his system, if system it can be called, which cannot be set at rest by all the lati tude of interpretation which he so freely indulges in. Hence his religious convictions perpetually mani fest themselves in language inconsistent with his philosophical theories ; and the utmost that can be attempted in a short analysis of his teaching is to give an outline of the system as it probably would have been had it been logically carried out, not as it actually appears in his own very illogical attempt to carry it out.
In the language as well as in the doctrines of Philo, we may trace the influence of Greek philo sophy in conjunction with the literature of his own nation. The theory, indeed, which would trace the term A6-yos to the few and unimportant pas sages in which it is employed by Plato, is too fan ciful and far-fetched to be tenable ; but the appear ance in Philo of the Stoical distinction between X6-yot 6.3fal.Ocros and X6-yos srpoq5opticOs, as well as his general use of the term; seems to indicate that in the employment of this word he was influenced by the language of the Greek philosophy, though per haps in conjunction with that of the LXX.* In the use of the cognate term ZoOla, as nearly, if not quite equivalent to that of A6-yos, he was probably more directly influenced by writers of his own nation, by the LXX. version of the Proverbs, and by the books of Ecciesiasticus and Wisdom.' Thus his language, no less than his matter, indicates compound character of his writings ; the two-fold origin of his opinions being paralleled by a similar two-fold source of the terms in which they are expressed.
It is necessary to dwell to some extent upon the writings of Philo, because it is through them, if at all, that the influence of the Greek philosophy on the Christian Scriptures is to be traced. Whether we admit the conjecture that St. John, during his residence at Ephesus, might have become acquainted with Philo's writings ; or whether we regard these writings as the extant representatives of a widely diffused doctrine, which might have reached the apostle through other channels,$ it is to the asserted coincidences between this evangelist and the Alex andrian philosopher, that we must look for the chief evidence for or against the theory which as serts an influence of Greek speculations on Chris tian doctrine. The amount of that influence, 'however, has been very differently estimated by different critics ; one of whom, as has been before observed, ascribes to it nearly all the distinctive doctrines of the Christian church ; while another considers that the whole resemblance between St. John and Philo may be accounted for by their com mon use of certain passages of the O. T., especially those concerning the angel of the Lord and the distinction between the hidden and the revealed God. The truth may perhaps be found in an in termediate view, if we distinguish between the Christian doctrine in itself and the language in which it is expressed. Notwithstanding the verbal parallels which may be adduced between the lan guage of Philo and that of some portions of the N. T., the relation between the Alexandrian and the Christian doctrines is one rather of contrast than of resemblance. The distinguishing doctrine of the Christian revelation—that of the Word made flesh—not only does not appear in Philo, but could not possibly appear, consistently with the leading principles of his philosophy, according to which the flesh, and matter in general, is condemned as the source of all evil. The development of Philo's doctrine, if applied to the person of Christ, will lead, as has been pointed out, not to Christianity, but to docetism ;* and in the distinction, which he constantly makes, between the absolute God and the secondary deity, who alone is capable of rela tion to finite things, we may trace the germ of a theory which afterwards, in various forms, became conspicuous in the different developments of Gnosticism.