The modes suggested for preventing bribery are by penal enactments or by secret voting, or by both. As to penal enactments, many things have been and may be suggested; but the history of legislation teaches us that the ingenuity of the law-maker is always left far be hind by the ingenuity of the law-breaker. It is impossible to say that any provision of any kind would exclude all the means of evading a law which have been and may be devised. If penal enactments however could greatly diminish bribery or reduce it to a small amount, the object would be substantially accomplished. But experience also teaches that the suc cess of laws in preventing things for bidden is not exactly in proportion to the severity of the enactments.
The arguments urged to show that secret voting would greatly reduce the amount of bribery are insufficient : in the case of small constituencies, the argu ments fail ; in the case of large consti tuencies, secret voting might render bri bery somewhat more troublesome. But it is probable that no penal enactments will ever materially diminish the amount of bribery in small constituencies, and that it will always be practised in such places, and perhaps, in large constituencies also when there is a violent contest. at least as much as if there were no laws against bribery. It remains then to consider what difference there is between the = punishable traffic in votes and the pre sent practice of selling them secretly in evasion of the law. If votes may be bought and sold like other thin' gs, no positive law is violated ; but a traffic is carried on in a thing which the judgment of all re fleeting persons condemns as demoralizing and as politically dangerous. If votes may not be bought and sold, but still are bought and sold, the law is secretly eved, and the demoralization and po litical danger are at least as great as if there were no laws against bribery ; unless the fact be that stricter penal laws will make bribery less than it would be with nut them. Those who think so should aim at improving this part of our penal code, but they should not forget to direct their legislation chiefly against the briber.
The sum is, that the best check on the traffic in votes is to make the constitu encies large, and as far as possible to concentrate them; and further to assimi late them to one another as much as pos sible, and so that every electoral district shall contain a large number of persons whose condition and station in society render them not accessible to the ordi nary means of bribery which a candidate can command. Small constituencies, whatever might be the qualification of the constituents, would be accessible to bribery. For it is a political principle which should not be overlooked, that all men may be bribed, but that different amounts and even different modes of bribery must be applied to different per sons; and also that a man might accept a bribe for his vote, and at the same time sin cerely condemn bribery. It is generally
assumed that the poor are most ready to sell their votes—a fact which is not proved by experience ; unless the word poor shall mean a man who is in want of money. But a man may be poor as compared with another, and yet may be better able to supply the wants incident to his station in life than another who is absolutely richer. It is he who is destitute of principle who may be most easily bribed, even if he is above want, and he who, whether he has principle or not, is in want of money u. supply his necessities : the guilt of him who takes a bribe, merely because he loves it, is inexcusable ; the offence of him who sells his vote to supply his necessities, has its excuse. But what excuse is there for the man who buys the unwilling vote of a starving man ? If it should be said that a less sum will buy a dishonest poor man's vote than that of his dishonest richer neighbour, the pro position would be true, but not fruitful m any practical consequences.
Every elector may be compelled to take the oath against bribery and cor ruption at the time when he gives his vote. Blackstone observes, " It might not be amiss if the member elected were bound to take the oath [against bribery and corruption] ; which in all probability would be much more effectual than ad ministering it only to the electors." If any party should be compelled to take such an oath or make such a declaration, it certainly should be the candidate. It would not be difficult to frame an oath or declaration so comprehensive as to in clude every possible mode of bribery that could be practised by a candidate or by his agent, or by anybody else with his knowledge and consent. The Romans directed all their legislative measures against the candidate, because it was easier to deal with him than all the electors, and because the proof of bribery is easier, when the receiver is not punish able, but the giver is. The English legis lation punishes both electors and candi dates when bribery is proved, and so renders the proof of bribery almost im possible ; and it does not require from the candidate the security of the oath or the declaration that may be required of the elector. It is difficult to understand how it should be supposed, as some sup pose, that a declaration from a candidate might not be made effectual, that is, so fidl and complete as to prevent him from taking the oath or making the declaration if he was privy to bribery ; and it is still more difficult to understand why the ex periment has not been made, except on the supposition that the members of the legislature have not hitherto been in earnest in their attempts to prevent bribery at elections.