Aristotle, after some preliminary re marks, concludes by defining a democracy to be, when the freemen and those not the rich, being the majority, possess the sovereign power ; and an oligarchy, when the rich and those of noble birth, being few, are in possession of the sovereign power. This definition of an oligarchy necessarily implies that the majority are excluded from participating in the sove reign power. It might be inferred, on the other hand, that in this definition of a democracy the few are excluded from the sovereign power : and such in this passage should be the meaning of the author, if he is consistent with himself. In another passage (iv. 4), where he is speaking of the different kinds of demo cracy, he speaks of the first kind as cha racterized by equality (merit rb Ycrov) : and by this equality he understands when the law (6 whios) of such a democracy declares that " the not rich have no more political power than the rich, neither body being supreme, but both equal, and all participating equally in political power." Such in fact approaches very near the exact notion of a pure demo cracy, or at least a democracy as pure as we have any example of; for all women, persons of unsound mind, males not adult, and slaves, are excluded from political power even in democracies. Aristotle adds : " But as the popular party (Hipps) is the majority, and that which is the will of the majority is supreme, such a censti• tution must be a democracy. Aristotle then mentions a second kind of demo cracy, in which the offices of the state are only open to those who have a property qualification, but it must be a small amount of qualification; and a third, in which all citizens have access to the offices of the state, unless they are under some special disability. But Aristotle still sup poses that this second and third kind of democracy, as he defines it, is subordinate to the law (a v4p.os); he supposes some thing like what we call a Constitution, or certain fundamental laws, in conformity to which the state is administered. For, after enumerating the various species of democracies, he says, "There is another kind of democracy which in all other re spects is the same as these, except that the people are sovereign and not the law ; and this happens when the enactments of the people are supreme and not the law." His exposition is founded on the nature of the democratic assemblies in the Greek States, in which all the people met in the assembly individually and not by repre sentatives, and were guided by their lead ers. He does not explain what the law is which in some democracies is supreme, and here his exposition is deficient in fullness and clearness. BM it appears that he means that there can be no stabi lity, unless there are certain fundamental rules which are respected and regarded as unchangeable. Where a com munity is sovereign, and every question can at any time be proposed to the as sembly, and any law can be changed and altered, it is clear, as Aristotle observes, that if Democracy is a Polity, such a government, in which everything is lia ble to be changed at any moment, is not properly a Democracy. Still it is a De mocracy ; but if a Polity is a stable thing, such Democracy is not a Polity. The Canton of Schwyz in its constitution comes very near to the notion of such a Democracy. Modern Democracies by virtue of the representative system are secured against perpetual change, for the people legislate by deputy, and continual change is practically made impossible.
A pure democracy then is where every male citizen, with the exceptions above mentioned, forms an equal and integral part of the sovereign body ; or, as Aris totle expresses it, where he is speaking of a democracy in which the people are supreme and not the Law, the democracy is " monarch, one compounded of many • for the many are supreme, not as indivi duals, but all collectively." This is the fundamental notion of a democracy every other institution incident to of existing in a democracy is either a neces sary consequence from this notion or a positive law enacted by the universal sovereign.
Thus it is absolutely necessary, in order that a democracy should exist and con tinue to exist, that the whole body should recognize the principle that the will of the majority must always bind the mi nority. There must therefore be some
means of ascertaining the will of every individual, who is a member of the sove reign body, and there must be no interfer ence with the free expression of his will, so far as such interference can be pre vented. Whenever the persons who com pose a democracy give their opinion on any subject, they express it by what is called a vote, which is recorded, and the majority of the votes is the will of the democracy. The vote may be given either openly by word of mouth or in writing ; or it may be given secretly, which is called vote by ballot, and the vote by ballot is considered by many political writers essential to secure the voter from all interference with the free expression of his opinion. Every freeman, being an equal part of the sovereign, has no re sponsibility in the proper sense of that term, such as some persons dream of: the many who compose the sovereign are no more responsible than when the sove reign is one ; and the notion that the vote of those who possess sovereign power should be open and notorious, on the ground of their being responsible, is in consistent with the notion of their possess ing sovereign power. The only way in which the universal sovereign can be so made responsible to a positive morality (for there is nothing else that such sove reign can be made responsible to) mat* be by the universal sovereign makir such open voting a constitutional rule, which rule the same body that made may repeal when it pleases. But if such rule is inconsistent with the free exercise by each individual of his share of sove reignty, it would be an act of suicide in the body politic.
If the democracy consider a constitu tion C,orterriTuriow] to be useful for carrying into effect the will of the sove reign, such constitution, when made by the expressed will of the majority, what ever may be the terms of such constitu tion, does not affect the principle of the democracy. Such constitution can be altered or destroyed by the same power that made it. If a representative body is necessary for effecting the purposes of the sovereign, such body may be elected and invested with any powers by the so vereign body, always provided that the representative body is responsible to the sovereign whose creature it is. What ever institutions are created, and whatever powers are delegated by the sovereign many, the principle of democracy stall exists so long as every individual and every body of individuals who exercise delegated power are responsible to the sovereign body by whom the power is delegated. Hence if property be made a qualification for certain offices, as in one of the forms of democracy mentioned by Aristotle, by the universal sovereign, such requisite qualification does not in itself alter the nature of the democracy, being only a rule or law fixed by the sovereign. It is, however, a rule or law of that class, the tendency of which, where the sove reign power is possessed by the many, is to undermine and ultimately destroy the power that made it.
Experience has shown that even where the universal people are sovereign, if the political community is large and spread over a great surface, delegation of power, however necessary, is accompanied with danger to the existence of the sove reign power. The more complicated the machinery of administration becomes, and the more numerous are the administering bodies interposed between the sovereign and the accomplishment of the object for which the sovereign delegates part of his power, the greater is the risk that those who have had power delegated to them will make themselves the masters of those who have conferred the power. In a de. mocraey the great problem must be to preserve unimpaired and undisputed the vital principle of the sovereign power being in all and in every individual, and to combine with this such a system of delegated powers as shall in their opera tion always recognize that principle to which they owe their existence. Aris totle (PoL iv. 5) well observes that a Polity may not be democratic according to the Laws, that is, the fundamental Laws or Constitution, but that by opinion and usage it may be administered demo cratically : in like manner a democratic constitution may come to be administered oligarchically ; and he explains how this may come to pass.