The exclusive jurisdiction of a court of equity is chiefly exercised in cases of merely equitable rights, that is, such rights as are not recognised in courts of law. Most cases of trust and confidence fall under this head. This exclusive jurisdiction is exercised in granting in junctions to prevent waste or irreparable injury ; to secure a settled right, or to prevent vexatious litigation ; in appoint ing receivers of property which is in danger of being misapplied ; in com pelling the surrender of securities impro perly obtained ; in preventing a party from leaving the country in order to avoid a suit; in restraining any undue exercise of a legal right ; in enforcing specific performance of contracts ; in sup plying the defective execution of instru ments, and reforming, that is, correcting and altering them according to the real intention of the parties, when such inten tion can be satisfactorily proved ; and in granting relief in cases where deeds and securities have been lost.
Various opinions have been expressed upon the question whether it would or would not be best to administer justice altogether in one court or in one class of courts, without any separation or distinc tion of suits, or of the forms or modes of procedure and relief. Lord Bacon, upon more than one occasion, has expressed his decided opinion that a separation of the administration of equity from that of the common law is wise and convenient " AU nations," says he, " have equity, but some hare law and equity mixed in the same court, which is worse, and some have it distinguished in several courts, which is better ;" and again, " In some states, that jurisdiction which decrees ac cording to equity and moral right, and that which decrees according to strict right, is committed to the same court ; in others, they are committed to different courts. We entirely opine for the sepa ration of the courts ; for the distinction of the cases will not long be attended to if the jurisdictions meet in the same m•-• son ; and the will of the judge will then master the law." Lord Hardwicke held the same opinion. Lord Mansfield, it is to be presumed, thought otherwise, for he endeavoured to introduce equitable doctrines into the courts of law. The old strictness has however been restored. His successor, Lord Kenyon, made use of these expres sions : " If it had fallen to my lot to form a system of jurisprudence, whether or I should have thought it advisable to establish different courts, with different jurisdictions, and governed by different rules, it is not necessary to say ; but in fluenced as I am by certain prejudices that have become inveterate with those who comply with the systems they find established, I find that in these courts, proceeding by different rules, a certain combined system of jurisprudence has been framed most beneficial to the people of this country, and which I hope I may be indulged in supposing has never yet been equalled in any other country on earth. Our courts of law only consider
legal rights ; our courts of equity have other rules, by which they sometimes supersede strict legal rules, and in so doing they act most beneficially for the subject" In this country the principle of separating jurisdictions has been largely acted upon. We have our courts of equity and law ; our bankrupt and in solvent courts, and courts of ecclesiastical and admiralty jurisdiction ; indeed until lately our several courts of law had, in principle, jurisdiction only over certain specified classes of suits. In countries governed by the civil law, the practice has in general been the other way. But whether the one opinion or the other be most correct in theory, the system adopted by every nation has been mainly influ enced by the peculiarities of its own in stitutions, habits, and circumstances, and the original forms of giving redress for wrongs.
In some of the American states, the administration of law and equity is dis tinct; in others the administration of equity is only partially committed to dis tinct courts ; in a third class the two jurisdictions are vested in one and the same tribunal ; and in a fourth there are no courts that exercise equitable jurisdic tion.
In most of our colonies the governor is invested with the jurisdiction of chan cellor; but In some of the most important colonies, where a judicial establishment of some magnitude is maintained, the chief or supreme court is invested with the chancery jurisdiction.
This attempt at the exposition of the general principles of what in this country is called Equity, seems to be better suited to a work of this nature than a fall de scription of the practice of, that is, the course of proceeding in a suit in a court of equity. The practice or procedure of any court can hardly be made intelligible to any person except one who knows something of it by experience ; and any technical description of it is useless un less it is minutely and circumstantially exact. It is desirable, however, that in addition to some knowledge of the sub jects,which belong to the jurisdiction of a court of equity, all persons should have some clear notion of the way in which the matters in dispute between parties to a suit in equity are brought before the court, and by what kind of proof or evi dence they are established. It may also be useful that persons should have a gene ral and, so far as it goes, a correct know ledge of the different modes in which such questions of fact are put in issue, and proved in our courts of law and equity. The following short outline of the course of proceeding in a suit of chancery, taken in connection with other articles in this work, such as CHANCELLOR, CHANCERY, DEPOSITION, and EVIDENCE, may pro bably give somewhat more information on the subject of equity jurisdiction that is found in books not strictly profes sional.