In the case of complete dissent or dis agreement by any one power, the con tract is, by the very nature of its terms, at an end ; for the contract being among sovereign powers, they cannot severally as such yield obedience to another sove reignty, which results from the aggrega tion of their several sovereign powers : their acts in their joint capacity must be acts of complete consent.
If the sovereign power in such a fede ral union has delegated the power of in terpreting the written instrument of union to certain judiciary authorities, appointed under the federal compact for the pur pose of carrying its provisions into effect, the several sovereign powers must still exercise, either by their legislatures or their judiciary authorities, their power to judge of the correctness of the interpret ation, just as much as if the several so vereign persons, in the case first supposed, themselves exercised the functions of so vereignty in the supreme federal govern ment.
What is commonly called the general government of the United States of North America is an example of a federation or federal government, or a supreme federal government. The contracting parties were sovereign states (the sove reignty in each state being in the citizens), which in their aggregate capacity formed a supreme federal government. The mi nisters for carrying into effect the federal government are the president and con gress the judiciary of the United States. By the preamble to the constitu tion it is in fact declared that the " people of the United States" are the contracting parties. The several states of the union are often still called sovereign and inde• pendent states, because they retain all the sovereignty which they have not given up, expressly or by implication, to the general government ; and it is considered that the chief business of the general go vernment is to determine and control the relations of all the confederated states to foreign states, and to make provision for the general defence. In practice, however, great difficulties arise in fixing the limits between the sovereignty of the states, such as it is, and the powers of the general government.
The fifth article of the constitution pro vides that " The congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it neces sary, shall propose amendmenti to this constitution, or, on the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the several states, shall call a convention for propos ing amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several states, or by conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the congress ; provided, &c. that no state,
without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the senate." From this article it is clear that the framers of the constitution did not fully comprehend the nature of the supreme federal govern ment; for it is assumed by this article that the several states may be bound with out their unanimous consent, which is contrary to conditions essentially implied by the nature of the union. This article involves also the inconsistency that the sovereign in any state may bind his suc cessors : if the case of a federation of in dividual sovereign persons bad been that to be provided for, the impossibility of the provision would have been apparent; but the impossibility equally exists when the contracting sovereign powers are re spectively composed of many individuals, for the abiding consent is still the essence of the union that has been formed.
This is not the proper place to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of a supreme federal government, nor to exa mine into its stability. That it is neees• wily deficient in one element of stability, which defect arises from the necessity for all the consenting parties to continue their consent, is evident: in this respect it is like a partnership for an indefinite period, which may at any time be dissolved by any one of the partners. Such a power, which is incident to the nature of the partnership, so far from being an objec tion to it, is a great advantage. So long as all the parties agree, they have the benefit of the union : when they cannot agree, they take instead of it the benefit of the separation.