The policy of the British government in issuing the orders in council of Novem ber, 1807, was maintained by its oppo nents to be wrong, on the double ground that it was both inexpedient and not war ranted by the principles of the law of nations. On this latter head it was argued that no violation of international law by one belligerent power could justify the other in pursuing a similar course.
The question, like all others connected with the law of blockade, appears to be one which must be determined chiefly by a reference to the rights of neutral powers, as regulated by the principle already stated, namely, that no neutral power shall be annoyed or incommoded by any warlike operation, which shall not have a greater tendency to benefit the belligerent than to injure the neutral. In this case the benefit which the British government professed to expect from its retaliatory policy, which was the excitement of a spirit of resistance to the original French decree both in neutral countries and among the people of France themselves, was extremely problematical from the first, and turned out eventually to be wholly delusive. On the other hand, the injury to neutrals was certain and of large amount, tending in fact to interdict and, as far as possible, to put a stop to the entire peaceful commercial intercourse of the world.
The orders in council were sometimes defended, for want of better reasons, on a very peculiar ground, namely, on that of the pecuniary advantage which the coun try derived from the captures made under them, from the increase of port dues which they occasioned, and from the revenue obtained by the licensing system.
In resting the justification of the orders in council upon the ground of their expe diency, their defenders of course Con tended that they were essential to the effective prosecution of the war, and that we were therefore justified in disregard ing the injury which they might indi rectly inflict upon neutrals. It was anti cipated, as we have observed above, in the first place, that the pressure of their operation would excite both the American government, and even the inhabitants of France themselves, and of the various countries of Europe subject to the French emperor, to insist upon the revocation of the Berlin decree. But the effect antici
pated was not produced. Neither the people of France, nor of any other por tion of Bonaparte's empire, rose or threat ened to rise in insurrection on account of the stoppage of trade occasioned by the edicts of the two belligerent powers; and America went to war, not with France, but with us, choosing to reserve the asser tion of her claims for wrongs suffered under the Berlin decree to another oppor tunity, while she determined to resist our orders in council by force of arms. But secondly, it was contended that the policy adopted by the orders in council was necessary to save our commerce from what would otherwise have been the ruinous effects of the Berlin decree. This argument, also, if its validity is to be tried by the facts as they actually fell out, will scarcely appear to be well founded. The preponderance of the evi dence collected in the course of the sue. cessive inquiries which took place was decidedly in favour of the representations made by the opponents of the orders, who maintained that, instead of having proved any protection or support to our foreign trade, they had most seriously embar rassed and curtailed it. The authors of the orders themselves must indeed be considered to have come over to this view of the mallet, when they consented, as they at lengtn lid, their entire re Peal In the actual circumstances of the pre sent case, the convenient interposition of America, by means of which British manufactured goods were still enabled to find their way in large quantities to the Continent in spite of the Berlin decree, would seem to have been the last thing at which the government of this country should have taken umbrage, or which it should have attempted to put down. As the French ruler found it expedient to tolerate this interposition, in open disre gard of his decree, it surely was no busi ness of ours to set ourselves to cut off a channel of exit for our merchandise, so fortunately left open when nearly every other was shut.