The question is further affected by the differences which exist in the natural rate of wages in various countries. Where the natural rate is so low as only to afford the bare means of existence, the least rise in the price of food must be fatal to numbers of the labouring popula tion, and, by thus limiting the supply of labour, must raise its price ; but where the natural rate is high, the labourers suffer indeed from a rise in the price of food, but their existence is not endan gered, the supply of labour is not dimi nished, and their wages consequently do not rise. From these circumstances it is evident that the precise condition of a country in respect to capital, population, and wages must be ascertained before it can be determined whether the price of food will affect the money rate of wages. It may however be generally affirmed, that in proportion as the market rate approaches to the natural rate, and the latter to the mere cost of the commonest subsistence, will the price of the neces saries of life affect the rate of wages.
When the causes which regulate the price of labour are undetstood, the folly and injustice of any legislation to fix the rate of wages are obvious. The seller of an article will always endeavour to ob tain a high price for it, which the pur chaser will only give if he be unable to obtain it for less. Labour is the most important object that man has to buy or to sell. Each will make the best bargain he can, and in this no law ought to re drain him. Laws may purpose to affect wages either directly or indirectly. Di rect interference with the rate of wages has been frequently resorted to. By several acts of parliament a legal rate of wages in particular employments was or dered to be settled, from which any devia tions either on the part of the employer or labourer were punishable. (See 25 Edw. III. Oat. 1; 34 Edw. III. c. 11; 13 Rich. II. c. 8; 11 lien. VII. c. 22; 5 Eliz. c. 4; 1 James I. c. 6.) Unless all the causes of high or low wages al ready explained be visionary, it is plain that no law can overrule them and esta blish a legal rate different from that which natural causes would have ipro &iced. It may embarrass the operations of trade, and mischievously disturb the freedom of the labour market ; but it cannot attain its immediate end—a com pulsory rate of wages. The experience of this fact has long since put an end to any such legislation in this country ; but the indirect effect of laws upon wages is still felt. The most pernicious interfe rence with wages ever effected by the in direct operation of a law, resulted from the mode of administering the laws for the relief of the poor. Before these laws were altered in 1834, it was the practice in most parishes, especially in the south of England, to give relief from the poor rate to labourers in proportion to the number of their children. The effect of such a system of relief was to remove the ordinary inducements to prudence in re gard to marriage, and even to encourage improvidence. The farmers, taking ad vantage of the addition made to wages from the poor-rate, offered lower wages than would have sustained a family ; and the labourer accepted them, because he was indifferent whether he received his pay from his employer or from the parish. The rate of wages thus became fixed, in agricultural districts, so low as barely to support an unmarried labourer; and as the parish would maintain a family, every man saw that by remaining single he would have no chance of improving his condition, and that by marriage he would be equally well and often better provided for. This system of relief in
juriously affected both the market rate and the natural rate of wages. The market rate was completely disturbed ; for a man was paid not according to the value and demand for his services, but in proportion to the number of his family. The natural rate was continually under going depression, because marriages being encouraged without reference to the suffi ciency of wages to support a family, population was extraordinarily promoted. At the same time, the property destined to support it was suffering diminution, by being taxed heavily for the payment of comparatively unproductive labour.
The only sound mode of raising wages and improving the condition of a people is to promote and encourage the increase of the general wealth of a country [WEALTH], by every means which legis lative science points out as best suited to that end ; and at the same time to remove obstructions, and give facilities to the moral and intellectual improvement of the working classes. By these means capital will be increasing with the natu ral growth of population; while the la bourers, with better habits, will be less prone to reckless improvidence, and con sequently not so likely to outrun the increase of capital.
It is not unusual for persons in par ticular employments to desire higher wages, and to enter into combinations against their masters in order to obtain them. Such combinations were formerly prohibited both by the common and sta.
lute law of this country ; but since the 5th Geo. IV. c. 95, if unattended with violence or intimidation, they are not un lawful. Unless he has bound himself by a contract, every man has a right to give or withhold his own labour as he pleases ; but he has no right to prevent others from disposing of their labour. But the only mode of rendering a combination effectual is to exclude fresh workmen, which frequently can only be done by molestation and threats, which are sub versive of the freedom and peace of society. Strikes, temperately conducted, cannot in principle be condemned being often a necessary protection to the work ing classes. When masters are not deal ing fairly with their workmen, the fear of a strike may often control them ; especi ally as, when acting unjustly, they would find a difficulty in obtaining new hands. But where the cause of a strike or com bination is not an occasional dispute con cerning wages, but an attempt to limit the number of workmen by compulsory regulations and bye-laws, and to dictate to their employers, it is injurious to trade, and ultimately to the parties themselves. To the labouring classes at large such combinations cannot be beneficial. When ever they are successful, it is by exclud ing many competitors, who are, of course, injured by the exclusion. The labour market must become clogged by a mass of exclusive trades, which render it diffi cult to find employment. The injury suffered by trade in consequence of the artificial limits to the supply of labour and the unnaturally high wages, must also have the effect of diminishing capital, and consequently the means of employing labour.
(Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations ; Ricardo's Politica Economy and Taxa tion; M'Culloch's Principles of Political Economy ; Malthus, Essay on Population.)