As to the wife's DOWER, see that ar ticle.
The Statute of Distributions (22 ft 28 Car. II. a. 10) gives to the widow of an intestate husband (if her claim has not been barred by settlement) one-third of his personal property when there is issue of the marriage living, and one-half when there is none. But the widow of a freeman of the city of London, or of an inhabitant of the ecclesiastical province of York (excepting the diocese of Ches ter), if the husband die intestate, leav ing personal property more than suffi cient to pay his debts and funeral ex penses, is enticed to the furniture of her bedchamber and her apparel (widow's chamber), or to 501. in lieu of it if her husband's personalty is worth 20001.; then the personal estate is divided into three parts, whereof one-third goes to the widow, one to the children, and one (the dead man's share) to his administrator. Of this last share the widow is entitled under the Statute of Distributions. which regulates the division of it, to one-third if there is a child, and one-half if there is not. The benefit of this custom cannot be taken from the widow by any fraudu lent device, such as a gift by the hus band to a third party whilst he was at the point of death ; or a gift with a re servation that it should only take effect after his death.
Marriage revokes powers of attorney previously granted by the wife, and dis ables her from granting them ; but it does not disable her from accepting such a power, or from acting on one granted to her before coverture. She may also be attorney for her husband. She can be queath her personal estate by will under a power.
The separation of husband and wife, and the effect of deeds made by them either in consequence or in contemplation of such an event involves many difficult questions. The ecclesiastical courts con
sider all deeds of separation and all cove nants in the nature of such deeds to be void. The courts of law, however, not only have supported such deeds against the husband, hut have enforced a cove nant made by him with his wife's trustees to pay her an annuity as a separate main tenance in the event of their future sepa ration, with the approbation of the trus tees. Whether such a covenant would now be supported by the courts of law is very doubtful. In order to render a deed of separation valid, it ought to be made by the husband and wife, with trustees for the wife, and any provision made in it by the husband ought to be for a valid con sideration, such as a covenant on the part of the trustees to relieve the husband from the wife's debts or maintenance ; the cruelty, or adultery, or desertion of the husband is a 'consideration, because the wife might have sued him in the ecclesi astical courts, and obtained alimony. But courts of equity will not interfere to en force such deeds, though by a strange inconsistency they will enforce the hus band's covenant for a separate mainte nance if made through the intervention of trustees, and indeed in certain rare cases if made between the husband and wife alone. Nor is the adultery of the wife a sufficient answer to her claim to the separate maintenance. It is doubtful whether the wife can anticipate or dis pose of this kind of allowance ; the more so, because it ceases if the cohabitation is renewed, or is only prevented by the perverseness of the wife. The ecclesias tical courts permit husband and wife to be sued separately.
A queen-regnant is legally a feme sole or single woman: and so is a queen-con sort as to property.
(Roper's Law of Husband and Wife edited by Jacob.)