The metaphysicians of our own country have exer cised a great deal of ingenuity upon this subject ; and have, in general, been favourable to the doctrine of' nominalism. Hobbes, Berkeley, Hume, Campbell, and professor Stewart, have all been decided nominalists, and have adduced many powerful arguments in support of their opinion. Cudworth and Locke, however, were realists, or rather conceptuaLsts; and we may join Dr Reid to the same class. The following short passage, from Cudworth, contains a pretty clear statement of the doctrine of the conceptualists. " It is a ridiculous conceit of a modern atheistic wri!er, Mr Hobbes, that universals arc nothing else but names, attributed to many singular bodies ; because, whatever is, is singu lar. For, though whatsoever exists without the mind be singular, yet it is plain, that there are conceptions in our minds objectively universal. Which universal ob jects of our mind,' though they exist not as such any where without it, yet they are not, therefore, nothing, but have an intelligible entity fin. this very reason, be cause they are conceivable ; for since nonentity is not conceivable, whatsoever is conceivable, and an object of the mind, is therefore something." Intel/. Syst. p. 731.
To this we shall oppose an argument of the Abbe de Coned'lac, an ingenious advocate for nominalism among the French. "11 von say that abstract ideas arc any thing but names, say, if you can, n hat that thing is.
In the case of number, when you take away the idea of the fingers, or any other objects which naturally suggest plurality, when you take away the names which are its signs, you will seek in vain for any idea in the mind ; there absolutely remains nothing." La Langue de Calculs, p. i. c. 4.
Lord Bolingbroke was of opinion, that a great deal of this controversy was merely verbal, and arose from not making a proper distinction between ideas and notions, which last arc altogether confined to the mind, and therefore need not be copies of any individual thing in nature. There are some philosophers w ho are so far realists or conceptualists, as to admit, that distinct mental notions or COnCefitiOnS, may be attached to abstract or general terms, such as whiteness, goodness, extension, &c. though they are of opinion, that there can be no pictures of these properties delineated in the mind ; and that they cannot exist externally, but as attributes to some subject. (n)