ADDISON'S Campaign.
The loss sustained in this battle by the vanquished, was immense. " By several letters intercepted, (says the Duke of Marlborough, writing to the Duke of Shrewsbury,) going from the enemy's camp at Det tingen to Paris, dated the 19th instant, they own, that this battle has cost them upwards of 40,000 men, killed, prisoners, and by the desertion since, upon their hasty march, or rather flight, towards the Rhine." Ten thousand French and Bavarians were 13 left dead on the field ; the greater part of 30 squa drons of horse perished in the Danube ; thirteen thousand were made prisoners ; 100 pieces of can non, 24 mortars, 129 colours, 171 standards, 3600 tents, SOO laden mules, 15 barrels and eight casks of silver, .Sen. were taken by the victors. On their side 5000 men .were killed, and 7000 wounded. The victory was not only complete in itself, but also most important in its consequences. Augsburg. was quickly abandoned by the French, the garrison of Ingoldstadt surrendered ; and- the fortress of Ulm, where the elector of Bavaria had retreated with the wreck of his army, was taken after a short siege. The house of Austria was saved from impending ruin, and the face of affairs in the empire entirely changed.
The following account of this memorable engage ment, from the pen of Prince Eugene himself, may probably prove gratifying to our readers ; and we have, therefore, kept it distinct from the above state ment, which-has been taken from the most approved historians. " With patience, and without fighting, Tallard and Marsin might • have forced me to have abandoned Bavaria ; for I had no other place than Nordlingen for the establishment of my magazines. But, those gentlemen were impatient, and the elector was enraged at the pillage which I had allowed Marl borough to commit ; who, by that means, was en tirely with me. We loved and esteemed each other.
-He was a great statesman and general. They had .80,000, as well as ourselves. But why did they se parate the French from the Bavarians ? Why did they encamp so far from the rivulet, which would have impeded our attack ? Why did they throw 27 battalions and 12 squadrons into Blenheim ? Why did they disperse so many other troops in the neigh bouring villages ? Marlborough was more fortunate than myself in the passage of the rivulet, and in his -fine attack. A little steepness of the bank made me half an hour later. My infantry behaved well : my cavalry, very ill. I had a horse killed under me. was checked for a moment ; but not repulsed. I succeeded in rallying some regiments, ,which had at first been shy of attacking. I led them -back four times to the charge. Marlborough, with his infantry and artillery, and sometimes with his ea .valry, got rid of that of the enemy, and went to take Blenheim. We were all driven back for a mo ment by the gendarmerie ; but we ended by pushing them into the Danube. I had the greatest obliga .tions to Marlborough for his alterations in the dis positionsaccording to circumstances. A Bavarian dragoon took aim at me ; one of my Danes luckily prevented him. We lost 9000 men ; but 12,000 ' French killed, and 20,800 prisoners, prevented them, this time, from singing the usual Te Deum for their .defeats ; which they- make it a point never to ac knowledge." Memoires du Prince Eugene. See al so, Smollet's Hist. of England, vol. ii. p. 23 ; Tin dal's Hist. of England, vol. vi. p. 549 ; Somerville's Mt. of the Reign of Queen Anne, p. 60 ; Account of the Battle of Hochstet, London, 1704 ; and Mili tary History of Marlborough, p. 58. (q)