AFFECTION, in the philosophy of mind, denotes a feeling excited by some external cause or agent, which is accompanied by pleasure or pain, and prompts us to communicate to the cause of the feeling, a correspond ing enjoyment or suffering. Affection may be distin guished from appetite and desire, by having persons, and not things, for its object; yet we sometimes extend affection to inanimate objects, as to a book which we have often read, or a tree under which we have often reposed, by a kind of sympathetic personification; and we should feel something like the loss of a friend, if the one were destroyed, or the other wantonly cut down. Affection is chiefly distinguishable from passion by its greater moderation and tranquillity. The tender regard between husband and wife, is denominated affection; but the ardour of a lover towards his mistress, is called passion. Affection exhilarates the mind without de stroying its tranquillity ; but passion disturbs our reason, deprives us of self-command, agitates even the body, and hurries us to action, by an almost irresistible im pulse.
No writer has treated of the affections so fully and ac curately as Dr Reid, by whom they are divided into two classes, the Benevolent and :Malevolent. The former dispose us to do good to our fellow creatures, the latter to injure them. The application of the term malevolent to an affection may seem harsh, but it is justified by the common usage of language, according to which we speak of being viell or if/ affected towards any person.
The benevolent affections, according to this author, all agree in two particulars, viz. that they are accompanied by an agreeable feeling, and that they imply a desire of good and happiness to their object. The most remark able of this class, are natural affection, pity, friendship, love, gratitude, esteem, and public spirit. The malevo lent affections, on the other hand, are attended with a painful emotion, and the desire of evil to their objects.
Dr Reid admits only of two legitimate priucildc s of this kind in the human constitution, iiz. Oli1H1011011 and ro SCIAIIICHt. PORI'S A.s..suy.• on Mc Juivc Pow, re. of :Ilan, Essay iii. c. 4.
The benevolent affections are productive of some of our purest pleasim s ; they compose the mind, wto nn the heart, enliven the spirits, and brighten every feature of the countenance. The malevolent affections, on the other hand, irritate the feelings, disqui•.t the temper, and even give deformity to the countenance. Ilere na ture gives us a plain and friendly admonition to cherish the former, and to suppress as touch as possible the lat ter. " One only good purpose which •e.SellIIIICIA Cali an swer," says Butler, " is to prevent or remedy injury. 11 it he not conducive to this end, it must necessarily con tradict not only the general obligation to benevolence, but likewise that particular end itself." •S'Cril1011 9. See MORAL PHILOSOPHY. (at)