In the beginning of 1537 a curious scene was exhibited, which seems to prove, that the natural foibles of Francis' character were too deeply implanted to be entirely ex tirpated by age and experience. Ile summoned the em peror to appear before the parliament of Paris, to answer as his vassal for the counties of Artois and Flanders ; and, on his refusal, declared them forfeited to the crown of France. He even marched into the Low Countries ; but either not being sincere, or not able to carry his purpose into effect, a suspension of arms was agreed upon, which was afterwards followed, A. D. 1538, by a truce for ten years. Shortly after this truce was agreed upon, Charles, on his voyage to Barcelona, was driven to take refuge in a small island on the coast of Provence. As soon as Francis heard of this, he proposed a personal interview, to which the emperor consented ; and thus these two rivals, after twenty years of hostilities, met each other, and vied in ex pressions of respect and friendship.
In the following year they had another interview. In consequence of the revolt of the people of Ghent, it was necessary for Charles to pass into the Netherlands from Spain. As expedition was necessary, he did not wish to pass through Germany, in which country he must have travelled with so much ceremony and pomp as must have delayed his progress. Ile did not like the uncertainty and risk of a voyage ; he therefore resolved to pass through France ; and, in order to induce Francis to permit this passage, and not to take advantage of it, by detaining him, he represented to that monarch, that he would cede the Milanese to him. Francis agreed to the proposal, and received and treated Charles with the utmost respect and magnificence, during his six days abode in Paris. A bon mot of Triboulet, the fool at the court of Francis, on this occasion, is recorded : lie wrote on his tablet, that Charles was a greater fool than himself, thus to expose himself in passing through the territories of his rival. " But what will you say, (observed Francis,) if I let him pass unmo lested ?" " I shall efface his name, and put yours in its stead," replied the fool.
As soon as the emperor had arrived in Flanders, the ambassadors of Francis required that the Milanese should be restored to their master. At first Charles gave no direct or decisive reply, till at last having reduced the Flemings to submission, he boldly averred that he had never given any promise to restore the Milanese. Francis was completely ashamed at his own folly, in thus being the dope of the emperor, and at the same time was filled with indignation and the spirit of revenge ; but he could not immediately continence a war, for, by his interview with Charles, he had excited the suspicion, or produced the in difference, of the king of England. The pope seemed resolved to maintain his neutrality. The sultan alone lis tened to his schemes of revenge and warfare. Still, how ever, Francis could scarcely feel himself justified in the eyes of Europe to commence hostilities, merely because the emperor had given him a loose promise to restore the *Milanese, and had not kept that promise ; but a more solid reason was not long wanting. Two French ambassadors were assassinated by order of the Milanese government. This was amply sufficient, in the spirit in which Francis had long been : He demanded instant and full satisfaction for their death ; he was evaded and refused ; and he re solved on instant war. Scarcely had Charles returned from a second expedition into Africa, A. D. 1542, when five formidable French armies entered his dominions. Spain, Piedmont, Brabant, Flanders, and Luxemburgh, were at 'once the scene of war. The Duke of Orleans reduced the greater part of Luxemburgh ; the dauphin laid siege to Perpignan: but, on a report that the emperor was advancing to its relief, the duke abandoned his con quests in Luxemburgh, and hastened to support the Dau phin. Perpignan was defended by the Duke of Alva, who had instructions from his master to hold out to the last extremity, as it did not enter into his plan to raise the Siege. The event proved that Charles was wise in his de termination ; for three months the French endeavoured to reduce it, but their troops fell before fatigue and disease ; and after that period, they were under the necessity of re tiring from before it. The armies of Francis' were equally
unsuccessful in their other attempts against the dominions of the emperor, so that he saw his vast preparations ren dered utterly useless.
The year 1543 was distinguished by few events of mo ment. Rochelle had revolted, but it was soon reduced. Luxemburgh was occupied by the armies of Francis; and the city of Nice was besieged by that monarch, in con junction with his ally the sultan : but this alliance was by -no means prudent or politic, as it gave great offence to those who might otherwise have united with Francis, that Ise should have allied himself to an infidel ; and this evil consequence of his alliance was not counterbalanced by success, for Nice was not reduced. The year 1544 was distinguished by the battle of Cerizoles. The young Count D'Enghien had penetrated into Piedmont, where •fle•wa4 opposed by the imperial general the Marquis del C-Nosto., The armies met at Ccrizoles, and the Imperia lists were defeated ; but the victory of the count was of little avail. The emperor, and Henry of England, (who at length had taken a decided part against Francis,) had entered Picardy with two numerous armies ; and, as Francis was by no means equal in force to his opponents in this quarter, the count was obliged to abandon the fruits of his victory in Italy, and hasten to the north of France. At no period were the affairs o••the French. monarch, to all appearance, more desperate than at this pet iod. The force of his enemies was so powerful, and his own means of resisting that force, or delay ing its progress, so inade quate, that had Charles and Henry united their armies, Paris, in all probability, would have fallen : But they were not men likely to agree long in opinion ; besides being suspicious of each other, they were both obstinate in their dispositions. Charles wasted his time in the siege of St Dizier, while Henry's immediate interest directed him against Boulogne. From these attempts neither of them would desist, even though they Intr,t have perceived, that if they gave them up for the present, Paris would be their immediate reward, and St Dizier and Boulogne would not long hold out after the capital was reduced. At this crisis, Francis, who had been long unable, from illness, to head his armies, committed the command of them to the Dauphin, who was not insensible to the dangers and diffi culties of his situation, but who conducted himself, on this occasion, with considerable skill and prudence. St Dizier was bravely defended ; nor would it have fallen if artifice had not been employed. On its reduction, though the emperor's army was considerably weakened by-the losses he had sustained during the siege, he resolved to pene trate still farther into France. Champagne was invaded, and Chateau-Thierry was taken,—a place within two days march of Paris. The fate of the capital seemed inevita ble, when the Dauphin threw himself between it and the enemy ; but he still cautiously avoided a battle, content ing himself with incessant skirmishes, and with depriving the enemy of the resources of the country. This plan had its desired effect : Charles, straitened for forage and ne cessaries, listened to terms of accommodation, and a de finitive treaty was signed at Crespy. By this treaty, Francis resigned his acquisitions in Piedmont and Savoy ; and the emperor engaged, in the space of two years, to grant his daughter or his niece in marriage to the Duke of Orleans ; and, as a portion, to give up either the Low Countries or the Milanese. It is evident, that this treaty, like the rest which Francis had entered into with his opponent, was favourable to the latter, in so far as the cessions to him were immediate and certain ; and of doubt ful advantage to the former, in so far as it contained merely a promise of a future cession to him : while, by such arrangements, reasons for future warfare were supplied.