" But what was much more inquicting to Great Britain than military encroachments, was, that France, by means of her commercial relations and the resources of her industry, assimilated to her self every country over which she had planted her victorious standards. She transplanted every where her habits and her manners. The flexible and pen etrating genius of the French was admirably cal culated to effect this moral colonization of Europe, and every attending circumstance seemed to favour its development. Ancient barriers fell, and the natural limits were effaced. It was thus that the military roads of the Simplon, of Mount Cenis, and Mount Genevre interlaced France to Italy, and united by short and facile routes the basins of the Rhone and the Po. Other immense works united France to Belgium and the Lower Rhine: rich conquests which restored the ancient import ance of Antwerp, and destined it to become again the centre of immense maritime action—an object at the same time most.dangerous to Great Bri tain."t Nor were British statesmen blind to their danger, and war was determined on, though Lord Hawkesbury, who negotiated the treaty of Amiens, and those who advised the measure, exerted them selves to preserve the peace.
The government of the United States seems to have, in a singular manner, at that time, misunder stood the real situation of European policy, if Mr. Lyman has quoted correctly, and we have no doubt of his accuracy in that or any other respect.
"In April and May 1803, Mr. Madison, secre tary of state, sent the following confidential and im portant communications to Messrs Monroe and Livingston in Paris." " If the French government, instead of friendly arrangements or views, should be found to medi tate hostilities, or to have formed projects which will constrain the United States to resort to hos tilities, such communications are then to be held with the British government as will sound its dispo sitions, and invite its concurrence in the war.
"Notwithstanding the just repugnance of this country to a coalition of any sort with the belligerent parties of Europe, the advantages to be derived from the co-operation of Great Britain, in a war of the United States at this period against France and her allies, are too obvious and too important to be renounced. And, notwithstanding the ap parent disinclination of the British councils to a renewal of hostilities with France, it will probably yield to the various motives which will be felt, to have the United States in the scale of Britain against France, and, particularly, for the imme diate purpose of defeating a r roject of the latter, which has evidently created much solicitude in the British government."4
The whole document, of which the preceding forms a part, is in itself a proof how very narrowly the United States escaped an entangling alliance to obtain an object which was falling into its hands by the irresistible course of human events. So far from any unwillingness to enter on war with France early in 1803, no concession that government could make to Great Britain could avert an immediate rupture. Charles James Fox was the only eminent British statesman who raised his voice amid the tempest of passion which attended and followed the deceptive treaty of Amiens. In all the long rival ry of centuries, there was, it may be safely assert ed, no other period when national hostility was more violent, and particularly on the part of Great Britain, than from the 27th of March 1802, when the treaty of Amiens was signed, to the 16th May when war was again declared against France.
We have already informed the reader, that an annunciation of her acquisition of Louisiana by cession from Spain, was promulgated by France immediately after the ratification of the treaty of Amiens; and we may very safely say, that without. any understanding with the United States, prepara tions on the part of France to form an establish ment at New Orleans contributed its full share to the declaration of war on the part of Great Britain.
Here again we may pause upon the reflection, how much and how salutary has been the rivalry of France and Great Britain to the United States. Sanguinary as was that rivalry, some compensa tions to its evils have been produced, and of those in its remote consequences, if the interests of the whole civilized world are taken into the estimate, was the union or incorporation of the vast regions of central North America with the original United States.
The union of Louisiana with the United States was foreseen by Count Vergennes, but the imme diate causes were very different from those antici pated by that French statesman. The conquest of that country from Spain was held in prospect, and it is probable that a feeling that such an attempt would be made on the part of the United States, ass sted to influence Spain to retrocede the whole immense territory to France. It was so retroced ed, and so much was the transfer dreaded in the United States, that we have shown that the pacific councils of Jefferson and Madison, considered war with France and alliance with Great Britain as pre ferable alternatives; and yet, the United States stand indebted to the retrocession to France for the peaceable and comparatively cheap acquisition of Louisiana.