ARRAIGNMENT, in Law, is a term used to denote that step of judicial process, in which a person, indicted for any crime, is called to the bar of a court, to answer the matter charged in the indictment.
In this sense, no one is properly said to be arraigned but at the suit of the king, upon an indictment found against him, or other record wherewith he is to be charged. The object of the arraignment is, that the prisoner do appear to undergo his trial, and hold up his hand at the bar, in order to identify the person ; and that he plead a sufficient plea to the indictment. The prisoner is to hold up his hand only in crimes falling under the description of treason or felony : but even this appears to be merely a ceremony, and not essentially necessary ; for it is quite sufficient if he, in any other manner, confess that he is the person.
The prisoner must be called to the bar by his name ; and, though under an indictment of the highest nature, he must be brought to the bar without irons, or any manner of shackles or bonds, and treated with all pos sible humanity ; unless there be reason to apprehend an escape, in which case he may be secured with irons. In the case of Layer, A. D. 1722, however, a difference was taken between the time of arraignment and the time of trial; and accordingly the prisoner stood in chains at the bar, during his arraignment ; which is now the general practice.
On arraignment, the indictment is to be read over to the prisoner distinctly, in the English language, in or der that he may fully understand the nature of the charge on which he stands indicted. The prisoner then either stands mute, or confesses the fact ; which circum stances, sir William Blackstone observes, may be called incidents to the arraignment ; or else he pleads to the indictment. See MUTE, CONFESSION, and PLEA.
By the old common law, the accessory could not be arraigned until the principal was attainted ; for this rea son, that if the principal had never been indicted at all, had stood mute, had challenged above thirty-five jurors peremptorily, had claimed the benefit of clergy, had ob tained a pardon, or had died before attainder ; non con stitit, whether or not any felony was committed : and it might happen, that the accessory should be convicted one day, and the principal acquitted the next, which would be absurd. This absurdity, however, could only have place, where it was possible that a trial of the prin cipal might be had subsequently to that of the accessory; and therefore the law still continues, that the accessory shall not be tried, so long as the principal remains liable to be tried hereafter. But the rule of the old law, in this respect, received sonic modifications from the sta tute I Ann. c. 9., which enacts, that if the principal be once convicted, and if, before attainder, he be delivered by pardon, the benefit of clergy, or otherwise ; or if the principal stands mute, or challenge peremptorily above the legal number of jurors, so as never to be convicted at all, the accessory may then be proceeded against, as if the principal felon had been attainted ; because, in any of these cases, there is no danger of contradiction. See Blackst. Comment. b. iv. ch. 25.; and ./Ippendix,§ I. to vol. Iv. also Jacob's Law Dirt. V. ARRAIGN. For the solemnity of the arraignment and trial of a prisoner, see Dalton, ch. 185. p. 515. (z)