ASSERTION or affirmation is the act peculiar to the verb, being never performed by any word which gram marians have referred to a different part of speech. That part of the verb by which it is most evidently and most frequently performed is called the Indicative. By means of it we convey information. This, though not the ori ginal object of language, is by far the most frequent ap plication of it, especially in an improved state of society. It proceeds from that great characteristic of our species, the love of knowledge, implying an inclination to convey it to each other. It is by means of affirmation that lan guage becomes the instrument of the most important im provements in human thought and in the character of so ciety. An inquiry into its nature must therefore throw considerable light both on thought and on language.
In affirming, we connect different ideas together, and thus dictate an arrangement which we wish such ideas to assume in the mind of the person addressed. To this object a particular part of speech is devoted ; but that part of speech often consists of a word which contains a sign of various other ideas. When we say " the man walks," the word "walks" contains the name of a par ticular motion, at the same time that it expresses a con nection betwixt that motion and the object denoted by "the man." Mr Tooke considers the verb as containing a noun and something more ; and he proposQs it as a question worthy of the attention of philosophers, what is that cir cumstance which, when added to a noun or the name of t,n idea, makes it a verb? The answer to this, in so far as the indicative is concerned, is, ,that it contains a sign of asserted connection betwixt the object expressed by that noun or name, and some other object which is also men tioned in the sentence. But we have other signs of con nection which are never considered as giving a word the nature of a verb. The genitive case implies a sign of connection betwixt the object expressed in that case and some other ; the adjective performs a similar office ; but there is a difference betwixt these signs of connection and that implied in the indicative of the verb.
The nature of these two sorts of signs, and the differ ence betwixt them, will be most clearly perceived by at tending to the structure of those languages which ena ble us to resolve the indicative of verb into its con stituent parts, by affording distinct signs for each. In Eng lish "the man walks" may be resolved into this sentence, " the man is walking." The termination ing implies a connection similar to that expressed by the genitive case or by the adjective, while the word is gives the sentence the character of assertion, and fits it for conveying new in formation.
• For the sake of possessing appropriate terms on this part of the subject, it will be convenient to borrow the technical language of logicians, who call a sentence a proposition, consisting of three parts, a subject, a predi cate, and a copula. In such a sentence as we have now mentioned, each of these parts is expressed by a separate sign. " The man" is the subject, " walking" the predi cate, and " is" the copula. The author of GRAMAAR in Dr Rees's Cycloptedia maintains, that is" does not ex press assertion, but connection. Connection, however, is often expressed by words of very different import : there fore that term is less appropriate to the copula than as sertion.
THE copula has been denominated the Substantive Verb, and it undergoes a variety of changes, called inflections, corresponding to the changes incident to other verbs.
The radical nature and common use of this verb is not, as Mr Harris supposes, to express existence, but to as sert a connection betwixt one object and another. The author now mentioned has been unfortunate in his mode of describing the use of this verb. He pronounces it an undoubted axiom, that " an object must first BE, before it can be ANY THING ELSE;" an opinion in all points of view untenable. In the first place, it is not necessary that the subject spoken of should have an actual existence. We
can speak of supposed as well as of existing objects. In the next place, an assertion that any object which has ex istence is something else, implies an absurdity.—What then is an assertion ? Do we by means of it assert an ob ject to be the same that is implied in the term used for an introductory designation? This is not the case ; it would form an unmeaning truism; and the predicate is generally a different word from the subject. In this act we neither assert the subject to be the same, nor to be something else. The office of assertion consists in pointing out a relation betwixt the subject and some other idea. The word "gold" has one meaning, and the word " metal" has a different one. When we say " gold is a metal," we do not intend to say that the words " gold" and " metal" have the same mean ing, but that the qualities expressed by the word " metal" are connected with the object called " gold." When we say "sugar is sweet," " wormwood is bitter," our intention is to produce in the mind of the person addressed a connec tion betwixt the ideas which have been previously attach ed to the word "sugar," and the further idea of " sweet ness," and betwixt the ideas attached to " wormwood," and the idea of " bitterness." Sometimes nothing may be previously known concerning the subject of the proposi tion. We may speak of sugar and of wormwood to a per son who has never heard of either. In that case the terms are only introduced as signs requiring the person address ed to attach to the one of them the idea of sweetness, and to the other that of bitterness, as contributing to those compound ideas of which he may afterwards consider the words as significant. The idea expressed in the subject must always be different from that expressed in the predi cate. This is the ease even though the expressions used would on a different occasion be synonymous. When the sentence " London is the capital of Britain," is uttered, if the hearer had any ideas about London, he is desired to connect with these the further circumstance of its being the capital of Britain : if he had no idea on the subject, except that London was a name written or pronounced in a certain manner, lie is desired to connect this word as a name with those which form the predicate of the sentence. Sometimes, by a figure of speech, the same word is used for the subject and the predicate : for example, " Home is home." In the employment of this figure, however, it will be found that such a word as " home" in these two situa tions has a different set of ideas attached to it. The mean ing of this sentence is, " Home, though often thought and spoken of with indifference, is, when made the subject of reflection, connected with feelings which interest and at tach us." The substantive verb differs from verbs of motion in being radically indicative in its character. Assertion is the cause of the contrivance of it. It does not originate in the imperative mode, any further than an imperative effort to command attention is implied in all language. The use of the substantive verb is, to direct the thought of a person to the connection of one idea, or one assemblage of ideas, with another, and thus to indicate congruities, incongrui ties, and relations of all kinds. The substantive verb is employed in the imperative, conformably with the usages of other verbs. We say, " be wise ;" " be ready to do your duty ;" but this imperative has always an awkward ness and a want of emphasis, compared to that of the ac tive verb. An active imperative may be considered in such phrases as understood. It seems an absurdity to desire any person or thing to be, or even simply to be connected with another object, or to be endowed with a particular character. The imperative radically implied in such sentences is a command or solicitation to use such exertions as tend to the production of a certain state. Sis probus means fac ut sis probus, cause yourself to be good ; act in such a manner as to support a worthy character.