All these sects, it will be observed, undertook to solve the phenomena of nature by means of hypothe ses, which excluded the operation of mind ; but which, it must at once be perceived, were altogether unsusceptible of proof. Modern atheists have in general been more cautious. They have contented themselves with endeavouring to refute the anni meats on which the belief in a Deity is founded ; and some of them have thought it prudent, like the ancient Pyrrhonists, to entrench themselves in unli 3 mited scepticism. By the aid of metaphysical sub tleties, they have sometimes confounded the ignorant, and perplexed even the rational believer. But we are confident, that the wonderful mconomy of the material world, the evident adaptation of means to ends, the mutual subserviency of different parts of na ture, the symmetry, the harmony, the manifest gni ty of design, and the numerous beneficial provisions for the accommodation and enjoyment of sentient beings, which every moment burst on our notice, cannot be contemplated by a sound and reflecting mind, without irresistibly impressing a conviction, in comparably more powerful than any of the transient doubts, resulting from objections which insinuate that all our knowledge is delusive.
If the indications of design be so abundant, and if the idea of Deity be so natural and obvious, whence is it, that a multiplicity of systems have been coutri• ved by speculative men, to account for the creation of the world without th•• Aid of intelligent power ? and what have been the causes which have led num bers to embrace these unsatisfactory tenets, or at least to reject the belief in a God ? Lord Bacon says, in one part of his writings, that the principal causes of atheism are curious controversies, and pro fane scoffing. In another place he adds to these, the unworthiness of priests, and. what he calls learned times, especially when attended with peace and pros perity. He says also, that atheism proceeds from folly and ignorance ; because, though in the thresh hold of philosophy, the mind, dwelling on second causes, may be apt to overlook the first cause, by proceeding farther, and marking the dependence and concatenation of the great series of. causes, we are brought to believe that the highest link is. fixed to the tbrone of God. These,.and similar expres sions which occur often in the works of this distin guished man, are singular in one respect : For in his Essays, he seems to doubt if there were ever any con templative atheists, except perhaps Bias, Diagoras, and Lucian ; and yet he is not struck with the in consistency of assigning causes for a phenomenon, the occurrence of which appeared to be so questionable. He maintains another position, which most. people will think paradoxical : He insists, that the atomical school of Democritus and Leucippus, " which is most accused of atheism, doth most demonstrate re ligion ;" because (as is no doubt true) it is incon ceivable that an anny of minute particles should have produced this orderly and beautiful universe, without a divine marshall to allot them their several Lttations.
He defends Epicurus against the charge of atheism and of dissimulation ; and yet, amidst all his incredu lity with regard to the existence of atheists, he says, that no heretics are more anxious to gain proselytes than they, and that they will even suffer in the cause, and not recant. We advert to these inconsistences, because we have seen the authority of Bacon quoted in favour of the opinion, that there can scarcely be a contemplative atheist ; whereas it is evident that his lordship's opinion was very fluctuating ; and we may have occasion to chew hereafter, that some of his other expressions on the subject are still more apt to mislead the inattentive reader.
We are convinced. that atheism mast, in all cases, irrational savages, have existed, it i3 said, who had ' never heard the name of a Deity, or even formed the idea in their minds ; 'and the creeds of many ancient nations present few traces of an enlightened belief. But this deplorable ignorance in which they were im mersed, this negative atheism, could never be ex pected to operate as a principle of action, till it grew up into that monstrous complication of errors which obtains the name of superstition, and which is related in the same degree to atheism as mania is to melan choly.
Bayle has been censured for saying, that there have been atheists and Epicureans, who excelled most of their idolatrous contemporaries in good mo rals. He vindicates his assertion not only by appeal ing to the testimony of credible writers, but by ac counting for the fact. He shews that other princi ples, besides regard to the will of God, may restrain men from gross vices —the love of praise, the fear of infamy, gentleness natural disposition, and the re straint of human laws. The first which he mentions is unquestionably the strongest. The love of repu tation is so powerful, as often to preponderate over every other impulse; and it is generally associated, in minds of a particular construction, with a romantic sense of honour, and a pride of appearing superior to the fear of punishment, or the hope of reward. The love of virtue, for its own sake, is much insisted on by a certain class of writers, as a principle of the highest efficacy ; but we cannot ascribe to it any very powerful influence over those who have so far overcome the native feelings of their minds, as to re fuse to recognise the signatures of wise and benevo lent design, imprinted on every department of nature.