The Athenians, while so great a storm was impend ing, were not inattentive to the means of security. Besides collecting all their own military force, they applied for aid to the other states of Greece, and par ticularly to the Lacedemonians. That slow and cau tious people, either from superstition or timidity, de clared that their religion rendered it unlawful for them to dispatch an army before the time of full moon. The other states were still more backward. The Plateaus alone, who lay under peculiar obligations to the Athe nians, joined them with 1000 men.
Miltiades was at this time the most eminent man in Athens. He was sprung from one of the most distinguished families in the city. Having conduct ed a colony to the Chersonese, where he reigned with almost absolute power, he had an opportunity, when led his expeilition against the Scythians, of observing the materials and disposition of the Persian armies. The Athenian system of military command seems then to have been singularly cumbersome and inconvenient. Ten generals were appointed, who com manded in rotation, each fol.- a single day ; while one of the archons, named the Polemarch, had the su preme decision in all doubtful questions. Miltiades, however, in this crisis of public danger, was raised by his own talents, and the wisdom of his colleagues, to the chief direction of affairs. Some urged the pro priety of protracted, and merely defensive system of warfare, until the torrent should have spent its force, and the strength of Greece had time to be collected. But Miltiades, addressing himself to Callimachus, who was then Polemarch, after representing the tran scendent importance of this decision, which would either obliterate the name of Athens, or raise her to the first rank among Grecian states, gave his opinion decidedly in favour of an immediate engagement. The whole Athenian people were now ardent and united in this glorious cause ; but a delay might breed divisions, and cause this spirit to evaporate. Room would be left for Persian influence and Persian gold, the fatal effects of which had been recently experienced in the fall of Eretria. Callimachus, satisfied With these arguments, acceded to the advice of Miltiades. Aristides, who was one of the ten generals, gave, on this occasion, the first example of that virtuous disin terestedness which marked his chardcter, by resign ing, on his day, the command to Miltiades. This ex ample was followed by the rest. Miltiades, however, with a prudent moderation, declined fighting till his own day arrived. He drew up his army in a man ner which enabled him to call forth all its ener gies, while it rendered unavailing those of the ene my. The strength of the latter consisted in cavalry • and bowmen ; accustomed to fight at a distance, and to advance and retreat alternately, over the vast plains of Asia. The force of the Grecian armies, on the contrary, consisted almost entirely in their heavy in fantry, armed with pikes, and ranged in a deep pha lanx. Miltiades, who knew the strength and valour
of this body, was satisfied, that when it came to close combat, nothing in the Persian army could resist its charge. To diminish the effect of superior numbers, he chose a spot which was confined on one side_by a mountain, and on the other by a morass. He placed his heavy armed foot, in which all his confidence rest ed, (though, including the Plateaus, it amounted only to 10,000 men,) on each of the wings, leaving the centre to be occupied by light armed troops, and even by slaves, a number of whom had been armed on this emergency. These were more numerous, but from their inferiority in discipline, Miltiades fully calculated on their giving way in the first instance. The Per - sians, on the other hand, ranged their cavalry and light troops in the wings, and placed in the centre the forces of Persia Proper, which alone were fitted to engage in close combat. Miltiades, in order to encumber the movements of the enemy's cavalry, had caused trees to be felled, and laid across the field. The Persian wings, however, advancing as well as these obstacles would permit, poured upon the Greeks a shower of missile weapons of every description. Athenians, agreeably to the order of Miltiades, did not return a single javelin, hut raising a shout; pressed forward in the most rapid manner upon the ' ranks of the enemy. A mode of attack so unusual, excited at first surprise and derision ; hut these .vere soon changed into terror, when they felt the charge of this formidable body, which their cavalry in vain attempted to penetrate. Every thing gave way be fore the weight of the Athenian phalanx, and in a short time both wings of the enemy were routed, and fled in confusion. Miltiades, then, recalling his vic torious wings from the pursuit, attacked in flank and rear the Persian centre, which, having defeated the troops opposed to it, was following them precipitate ly. The most arduous part of the contest now en sued ; for this was the body whose firmness had dis sipated all the other armies of Asia. Its situation, however, and the superior valour of the Greeks, soon decided the conflict. The Persians, routed, sought refuge in their ships, whither they were pursued by the victorious Greeks. As an instance of the eager ness with which the latter followed, it is related, that one, having laid hold of a boat with his band, when that was cut off, seized it with his teeth. The Athe nians, in this engagement, lost only 200 citizens, with two of their generals, one of whom was Callimachus the polemarch. The Persians left upwards of 6000 on the field of battle, besides losing an immense booty, and several of their ships. They then made an at tempt, by doubling the promontory of Sunium, to take Athens by surprise. But Miltiades, by a rapid march, arrived in time to render this attempt fruit less. The Persiais commander then sailed back to the coast of Asia.