From this humiliating picture, we turn with satis. faction to review the ,unperishable monuments of '`Bacon's &his. In the intervals of his professional studies at Gray's Inn, he had conceived the de iign of a great undertaking, to the accomplishment. of which he applied with incredible vigour, amidst the multiplied interruptions and disqmetudes of a bustling life. We have already noticed his early dissatisfaction with the Aristotelian doctrines ; and though he was not the first, who discerned the in utility of the scholastic logic as an instrument of discovery, lie was certainly the first, who erideallottr‘.. ' cd to reduce into a methodical digest, the legitimate 1 rules of philosophising. His first work, which in '— some degree unfolded his plan, was printed in 1605, and professed to treat " Of the Proficience and Ad vancement of Learning." It was afterwards greatly enlarged and improved; and, having been translated into Latin by the Rev. George Herbert and some other scholars, was published under the well known tithe, lle Dignitate et Au„ontentis Scientiarum. The important object which the author proposed was, to trace the boundaries of the sciences then known, to point • out their mutual connections and dependencies, to exhibit a view of their relations to the different faculties of the human mind, to introduce a natural classification of their various branches, and to enu merate the defects and omission§ in all the attempts made by former inquirers. According to Bacon, all the varieties of human knowledge may be ranged under history, poetry, and philosophy, corresponding to his division of the idtellectual faculties into me mory, fancy, and reason. He distributes history in to natural and civil ; poetry into narrative, dramatic, and parabolic ; science into theology, and philo.ophys the latter relating to the Deity, nature, and man ; which is merely a repetition of Aristotle's classifica tion. An analytis of this work could convey. no adequate idea of its value. Though debased by a considerable proportion of trifling matter, it contains many profound, acute, and original observations, and evinces an extent of erudition, •a clearness of appre hension, and a solidity of judgment, which claim the highest admiration. A number of the particulars which he marks as desiderata, or as undiscovered regions in the'world of science, are indeed more fantastical than solid; and it is greatly to be regretted, that the whole of the performance is obscured by a cumber some load of uncouth and affected phraseology. Thus he divides natural philosophy into the mine and the furnace, and the philosophers into pioneers and smiths, or diggers and hammerers; the former en grged in the inquisition of causes, the latter in the production of effects ; the former speculative, the latter operative. Our limits do not permit Ili to en ter into a critical examination of Bacon's arrange ment of the sciences, against which it is easy to pro pose many- objections ; but no less exceptionable ar rangement has hitherto been offered to the world.
The work which 'Bacon esteemed the chief of his writings, the Novum Orgrtnum Seientiarunt, was printed in 1620, a short time before his fall. It was intended to supply one of the great defects which he had noted in the method of directing the human fa culties;the want of a rational or inventive logic. His opinions on this subject are condensed into the form of aphorisms. Instead of the ancient method of syl. logism, he proposed to conduct philosophical inqui ries by what he called induction, in which we rise from an extensive collection of particular facts to general conclusions. He laid down a series of rules for making observations and conducting experiments. But the most essential service which he has rendered to science, is the investigation of those causes of false judgment, which are most intimately connected with the natural and acquired dispositions of the mind. These sourses of error he has numbered under four heads, which he calls idola tribes, idola specus, idola Joni, and idola theatri ; by which terms he means the prejudices arising, 1. From the original and universal disp -itions of the hinnan mind; or, 2. From the peculiarities of individual constitutions and ha bits ; or, 3. From the imperfections and abuses of language, the medium of communication between man and man ; or, 4. From the attachment to prevalent theories and erroneous rules of judging. The object of the whole work was to reclaim men from the de vious and intricate paths, in which they had long wandered, to the sound and profitable application of their understandings. Its principal fault is the ob scurity resulting from the want of illustrations ; a fault not chargeable on the author, who could not be expected to invent specimens of-a mode of proceed ing hitherto little cultivated: James I. said of this
book, that it was like " the peace of God, which passeth all understanding." These works formed the two first parts of the plan, to which the author gave the name of Instau ratio Magna ; the first containing a distribution of the sciences, and the second unfolding a mode of procedure in the interpretation of nature. His plan embraced foeir other objects, for the accomplishment of which he had thrown together many detached hints under various titles. His third object was to prepare an arrangement of the phenomena of the universe, with a view to establish natural philosophy on the basis of observation and experiment. The exe cution of this object was attempted in his Sylva Syl yarem, a work of very indifferent merit. The fourth part of his labours, which lie called Scala Intellectus, lie intended to devote to a progressive series of in quiries, containing a detailed exemplification of his method in the various sciences. The fifth part, de nominated Prodromi, sire Anticipationes Philoso phic Secendw, was intended as a temporary disposi tion of his materials till there was leisure to complete the whole structure, by the addition of the sixth part, which he called Philolophia Sccunda, sire Scientia Active, to which all the other steps were pre paratory. This ultimate object of all his labours was to establish a system of philosophy on the severe and chaste principles of experimental research; but lie had not the temerity to expect, that he would ever be able, personsally, to conclude this arduous task.
What his lordship did accomplish was unquestion ably a vast accession to the progress of the human mind ; hut his merit is probably overrated by many, who kno'w little of the real value of his writings. The minds of men had been gradually preparing to cast off the yoke of authority. The revival of let ters iu the 15th century, the invention of printing, the reformation of religion, and various other causes, had introduced a freedom of discussion, over which the doctrines of the schools had little controul. In .dividuals had sprung up in different kingdoms, who had the hardihood to revolt from the dogmas of Aristotle ; and others, who, by devoting themselves to experimental inquiries, had demonstrated the fal lacy of many opinions hitherto deemed infallible. Juhn of Salisbury, Grosthead bishop of Lincoln, Roger Bacon, Occam, Erasmus, Ludovicus Vivcs, Faber; and even Paracelsus, Montaigne, and Bruno, as well as Luther and his coadjutors, had taught men to question the decrees of the Lyceum, and to set at nought the thunders of the Vatican. Dr Gilbert had ascertained the laws of magnetic action, and furnished an admirable specimen of the induc tive method. Copernicus had discovered the true theory of the planetary revolutions ; a theory which Bacon impotently endeavoured torefute. Other emi nent men, contemporary with Bacon, and unaided by his writings, particularly Galileo, Kepler, and Gas sendi, were pursuing a course similar to that which he delineated, and acquiring immortal fame by im provements in geometry and physics, of which sciences he had scarcely learned the rudiments. It must not be disguised, that Bacon' had never formed a fair estimate of the praise due to his predecessors and fellow-labourers. His Censure of the more Eminent Philosophers is expressed in the most' acrimonious strain of scurrility. He was too ambitious of Milo ' vation, and too fond of paradox. In violation of his own rules, he often assumed facts without sufficient ly scrutinising the evidence on which they rested, or sometimes without any examination at all ; and very frequently, in his'attempts to account for facts, lie negligently acquiesced in hypothetical principles, which had obtained a popular currency. His dis tinctions are often perplexed, or indefinite, particular ly with regard to physical and metaphysical science. ' His language also is destitute of precision, being ex travagantly metaphorical, and also replete with un natural conceits and obscure allusions. It is much more reprehensible than Aristotle's, which he has ,blamed for abounding with new words. Lord Ba con professes to retain the ancient terms; but to al -ter their uses ; a practice which is apt to puzzle and mislead ordinary readers. With all these faults, and others on which it might seem invidious to dwell, Bacon must be allowed the merit of having bequeath ed to the world a larger and more precious mass of sound logical instructions, deduced from his own re , flections, than are to be lound in the writings of all the authors who preceded him.