Some have asserted that the adjective by itself expresses no idea. This opinion has arisen from the circumstance, that it supposes some other idea expressed by a different word. But this is in reality an addition to its meaning. Every idea expressed by a substantive may also be ex pressed by an adjective, and vice versa. The idea ex pressed by " man" is also expressed by " manly ;" and the idea expressed by the adjective " good" is also expressed by the substantive " goodness." Perhaps it will be alleged that, when we use the adjec tive, we do not give a full of an object, but merely refer to it by mentioning a quality founded on some connection with it ; that the wards 44 Roman," " English," Ciceronian," do not imply the full meaning of "Rome," " England," and 44 Cicero." In answer to this we must ob serve, that the greater part of words in a sentence are merely introduced for reference. Sometimes, where many words are used, and many objects of thought mentioned, those which are mentioned on their own account are com paratively few, the greater part of the words, including the nouns employed, being merely introduced for the sake of reference. "A Roman senator," and "a senator of Rome," mean exactly the same thing; therefore the ideas contained in the word '' Rome" are also contained in the word " Roman." Those whose reflections are in the habit of suggesting more Fubtile arguments may object, that the word 64 Rome" is a proper name, while 44 Roman" expresses a general quality. This, however, is the same objection in a differ ( nt form. A part the word " Roman" is a proper name. Tice e:encrality of such adjectives arises fi om the variety ofcosio ns h proper names may be used. Their application in connection with other words thus becomes general, and the same thing may be said of any a noun that implies definite connection with other words. The adjectives " Roman," 44 Grecian," " French," " Eng lish," " Alexandrian," " Ciceronian," a Foxite," a Pittite," contain the names of individuals, but they become general from being applicable to many objects. A relationship to an individual becomes a generic quality.
There are, however, adjectives which express the pos session of general qualities founded on no reference to a particular individual. These adjectives have less appear ance of composition than those now mentioned, and are al ways shorter than the substantive nouns used to represent the qualities as separate objects. 44 Good," " bad," 44 hard," " soft," " light," 44 heavy," are shorter words than " good ness," " badness." " hardness," " softness," lightness," and " heavir- ss." it is from the aspect of words of this sort that grammarians have concluded that the adjective does not express a complete idea. They are never derived from the general name of the quality. It has been imagined that the ideas which such adjectives express are essential ly general, that they have no corresponding objects pos sessed of an individual existence, and that, when substan tive nouns, such as " goodness" and 44 badness," are de rived from them, a forced effort is made to treat qualities in language as if they were substances. The just conclu sion was not drawn, that substantives and adjectives, as mutually distinguished, are forms fitted for certain pur poses in language, and not signs founded in any differ ences in the nature of the external objects signified.
The reason of the comparative brevity of words signify ing general qualities, when in the form of adjectives, has been already hinted at. Individual instances of these quali
ties have no separate interest attached to them, and there fore the words expressing them contain an intimation of their annexation to some group. The names of groups, even though generic, are in the first instance so contrived as to be fitted to become the names of leading subjects of discourse ; and ever after merely require a proper intro duction to render them distinctive signs for individuals. It is at a more advanced period of human thought that sin gle qualities become separate objects of attention, and then it is natural to create names for them by the composition of words previously in use.
The adjective, like the genitive case of the noun, is a word subordinate to a noun by which it is introduced. Sometimes it is employed to remind us of one of the ideas contained in the noun, as when a poet speaks of " fleecy clouds." " the azure sky," 44 and verdant foliage ;" or when a historian, under impressions of indignation at any series of outrageous conduct, uses such expressions as "the infa mous Robespierre." The most usual effect of adjectives is, to reduce within a more limited range the application of a general term, by the addition of a circumstance which belongs only to a li mited part of the genus which that term expresses. "A man" means one individual belonging to a certain class of beings. The words, 44 a good man," represent one belong ing to a limited part of that class. An additional circum stance, attached by means of another adjective, would limit the meaning still more: and an accumulation of adjectives of this sort is capable of affording a combination of suffi ciently limited occurrence for any purpose of distinctive description.
The subordination of the idea contained in the adjective to the noun with which it is coupled is in some instances less strict than in others. On some occasions, the ideas expressed by these two parts of speech might exchange places, without any material alteration in the meaning of the compound designation thus formed. written libel" is equivalent to " a libellous writing ;" rr a false assertion," to " an asserted falsehood." Although the purposes of connection in discourse require one of the ideas thus near ly equal in importance to be expressed by a substantive noun, the choice is left to the option of taste and conveni. cute. In other instances in which they may be made to shift places, when the ideas which they express are the subject of a sentence, a corresponding change is required in the predicate, in order that the identity of the meaning may be preserved. The sentence," a good man is a happy man," may be converted into " human goodness is condu cive to human happiness." It sometimes happens that the adjective expresses the idea which is intended to be the principal, and to which that expressed by the substantive noun is subordinate ; as in the Latin phrase ab urbe condita ad (urbem) liberatam. In the translation of such phrases, the idea that is primary is expressed by a substantive noun, and the subordinate one by an adjective. The primary ideas introduced in this phrase, by the prepositions ab and ad, are the " building" and the 44 deliverance ;" hence it is translated, " from the building to the deliverance of the city." Such idioms are to be considered as arbitrary inversions of the parts of speech, and do not invalidate the original subserviency of the adjective to the substantive noun, as well as of the ge nitive case to the noun by which it is introduced.