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Chancery

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CHANCERY, (canccllaria,) the high court of judica ture, in which the lord chancellor, in his judicial cha racter, exercises his very extensive authority. It is of great antiquity, and is inferior only to the parliament in point of dignity and power. Its jurisdiction is twofold, and is commonly distinguished into ordinary and extraor dinary. Each of these forms a distinct tribunal, do: former being governed by the rules of common law, the latter by those of equity. In the ordinary or common law court are held such pleas as, the king being a party to them, are remediable at common law, but by suppli cation to himself in the person of his chancellor. Of this kind are, plea upon a Bare facias," which is held," to use the words of Blackstone, " to repeal and cancel the king's letters patent when made against law, or upon untrue suggestions ; plea of petitions, monstrans de droits; traverses of offices, and the like, when the king has been advised to do any act, or is put in possession of any land.; or goods in prejudice of a subject's right ; on proof 01 which, as the king can never be supposed to do any wrong, the law questions not but he will immediately redress the injury, and refers that conscientious task to the chancellor, the keeper of his conscience. In this ordinary court," continues the same writer, " is kept the officina justitia, from which issue all original writs that pass the great seal, all commissions of charitable uses, sewers, bankruptcy, idiotcy, lunacy, and the like; and for which it is always open to the subject, who may there at any time demand and have, cx debito justitic, any writ that his occasions may call for." The extraordi nary court, on the other hand, proceeding by the rules of equity, softens the rigour, but by no means opposes the spirit, of the common law, in those cases where, by reason of the unavoidable generality of that law, mani fest injustice would result by its undistinguished appli cation. Accordingly, this court interposes in all cases of frauds, deceitful or rash engagements, &c. which ad mit not of remedy at common law. It gives relief in the case of minors, against as well as for them; of mar ried women pending their coverture, and in certain suits at their instance against their husbands ; of breach of trust; loss of titles to lands, &c.

Without, however, attempting to elucidate further the nature of the jurisdiction of this high court, or to enu merate the variety of pleas to which it is competent, (a task which has puzzled the ablest writers, even when free to investigate the subject in the fullest manner,) we shall content ourselves with one or two general ob servations on this and other courts of equity, taken from a modern treatise of respectable character. "Early in the history of our jurisprudence," says Mr Mitford, in his work on the Pleadings in Chancery," the administra tion of justice by the ordinary courts appears to have been incomplete. To supply the defect, the courts of equity have gained an establishment; assuming the power of enforcing the principles upon which the ordinary courts also decide, when the powers of those courts, or their modes of proceeding, are insufficient for the purpose ; of preventing those principles, when enforced by the or dinary courts, from becoming, contrary to the purpose of their original establishment, instruments of injustice; and of deciding on principles of justice, where the interference of a court of judicature is necessary- to prevent a wrong, and the positive law is silent. The courts of equity also administer to the ends of justice, by removing impediments to the fair decision of a ques tion in other courts; by providing for the safety of pro perty in dispute, pending a litigation; by restraining the assertion of doubtful rights, in a manner productive of irreparable damage; by preventing injury to a third per son from the doubtful title of others ; and by putting a bound to vexatious and oppressive litigations, and pre venting unnecessary multiplicity of suits ; and, without pronouncing any judgment on the subject, by compel ling a discovery which may enable other courts to give their judgment ; and by preserving testimony, when in danger of being lost, before the matter to which it re lates can be made the subject of judicial investigation.