His disappointment, though keenly felt, was surmounted by a cheerful and sanguine temper ; and he prosecuted, with renewed industry, his literary labours in the country. In 1742, he published the first part of his Essays, which met with a reception sufficiently favourable to console him for his first disappointment. In 1745, he resided as a com panion to the Marquis of Annandale in England for twelve months ; and, from his appointments during that time, ac quired a considerable accession to his small fortune. About this time the professorship of moral philosophy in the uni versity of Edinburgh becoming vacant by the resignation of Dr (afterwards Sir John) Pringle, Mr Hume became a candidate for that situation ; but the sceptical principles which he had advanced in his first work were too offen sive to allow the magistrates, who were the patrons, or those learned persons whom they consulted, to receive him as a public instructor of youth, and that application was consequently ineffectual.
In 1746, he accompanied General St Clair, as his private secretary, in an expedition destined for Canada, which ter minated in an incursion on the coast of France. In 1747, he attended the same gentleman in his military embassies to the courts of Vienna and Turin. From this cause his literary occupations suspended for two years ; but he enjoyed with much relish, that polished society-which he highly ornamented, and in which he was a general favour ite. At this time lie attempted to give a more popular form to his first speculations, in a work entitled An Inquiry concerning the Human Understanding ; which, however, had little better success than the original treatise. A new edition of his Essays was also published, which met not with a much better reception. Mortified in some degree, but not discouraged, by these miscarriages, he continued his efforts to rouse the attention of the world to his favourite subjects. He had now returned to his brother's house in Scotland, where he composed his Political Discourses, and his Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals. His opinions had gradually worked themselves into notice ; an effect which the plausibility of his reasonings, the charms of his language, and the importance of the subjects, could not fail to produce. Being adverse to the prevailing phi losophy, as well as bearing strongly on the religion of the age, and considered by many persons as alarming in their tendency, they could not, of course, be permitted to extend their influence, without having their validity subjected to the most rigid scrutiny. Mr Hume, either unalterably con
fident in the justness of his views, or considering them as less important than his fame, was principally disposed to look on the appearance of a succession of replies, as flatter ing symptoms of his rising reputation, and derived from them encouragement to proceed in his career. In 1752, his Political Discourses were published. This was the first of his works which gained immediate attention, and gene ral approbation. He also now published his Inquiry con cerning time Principles of Morals, a work which met with little notice, though more highly valued by the author than any other. It appeared to correspond too much with the sceptical principles of his other writings on moral subjects, by referring all moral distinction to utility. it certainly, however, displayed much acuteness of research, and con tributed to remove much of the rubbish by which questions of this nature had been encumbered. The dangerous cha racter which Lord Karnes, and some others of his oppo nents, attached to a theory which reduced all moral differ ences to utility, as leaving them to the arbitrary decisions and varying judgments of individuals, is more or less appli cable to every theory on the subject. The agreement or disagreement of mankind on particular moral questions, is rather matter of fact than of theory. The apprehensions of any dangerous tendency attached to the theory of Mr Hume, imply, in their most obvious sense, a contradiction in terms. Utility is, in itself, real and precise, however obscurely un derstood ; and in its very essence excludes all idea of danger. We have, indeed, heard particular acts represent ed as inculcated by utility, while their danger was capable of being painted in the most convincing terms. These ar guments only prove, that the character of utility may be rashly applied, while some circumstances essential to it are omitted. Utility, indeed, is not a simple original principle. 'It is a general feature, applicable to a variety of phenome na, among which human actions are to be numbered ; and even with those who grant that there are prior principles of our nature which serve to suggest moral distinctions, all such suggestions must be allowed to become the subjects of computation ; and in all discussions of the propriety of particular actions, utility is the ultimate test to which we are referred, and is necessary to stamp them with the cha racter of rectitude.