INSANITY. This word ought, from its etymology, to signify " want of soundness," or want of heaith." It is applied, in the English language, to denote an unsound state of the mental powers. It is generally used as synony mous with " mental derangement." But it is more pro per to consider it as including a greater extent of malady, by comprehending cases in which the mental powers arc in themselves deficient, as well as those in which they are disordered.
It is a matter of great importance to fix the definition and characters of insanity with such precision, as to ren der the practical application or just principles on the sub ject a matter of certainty. The imputation of insanity to any individual brings alter it the most serious consequen ces; as it subjects him, in the best regulated communities, to the loss of the common privileges of a man and a citizen; and, in certain states of society, and during the prevalence of certain opinions, is followed by subjection to the lowest degradation, to utter contempt, to horror, and even to cruelty. As soon as a man has been declared insane, it has too often happened that he has not only been excluded from the common enjoyments of society, but cut off from all that consideration and tenderness by which comfort is preserved, and has been committed to the custody of per sons, who had no interest in his recovery or welfare, and from whom no dutiful line of conduct was exacted or ex pected. The rash application of such an imputation is an even:, the possibility of which, under these circumstances, cannot be thought of without horror. But, even under the Ine‘alence of tne most humane piinciples, and the most considerate and discriminating treatment of the different descriptions of insane subjects, the question does not lose its importance, 1Nrhen ought any indiNidual to be pronounc ed insane ? Human minds are so differently constituted ; their ex cellencies and defects are so often and so Ltratigely blend ed, and contrasts so striking present themselves in the mental features of the same individuals ; the gradations of mental qualities and mental states are likewise so nu merous, and difficult to separate from one another ; that this question is as hard as it is momentous to solve.
Practical distinctions, with a view to legal proceedings, therelme, are very properly regulated by the effects which the mental character and state produce on those parts of conduct which are essential to man as a member of society, and the safety and suitableness of aliowing him to remain at large, and manage his own property and interests. This is inure kept in view than the minute analysis of the mode in which the mental operations are conducted. It is a common adage, that the chief difference between a fool and a wise man is, that the wise man has sufficient art to conceal his deficiencies. We only descend a grade lower, when we dissim4uish an insane from a sane timid. titan in describing what we commonly call a foil in contradistinc tion to a wise man. It is often a fiat and total loss of a view
of his relationship to other men, in addition to those follies which arc common to him with many other persons, that decides a man to be insane.
It often appears an important point, when an atrocious action has been perpetrated, to determine whether it should be ascribed to insanity or to crime. But, it may be observ ed, that every case in which this point is questionable, is ultimately determined by utility, and the influence of ex ample. Minds so constituted by nature, or distorted by disease, that the common motives of mankind do not reach them, are very different from those in whom an obtuseness to humanity, justice, and rational fear, is the direct effect of a depraved self-indulgence. In the former, common motives are precluded from all operation, and their ac tions arc, in this respect, entirely fortuitous ; whereas the latter are cases, by the punishment of which a numerous description of persons are restrained from criminal actions. To prevent crime is the object of criminal legislation, and not to gratify, by the infliction of pain, that just antipathy which the virtuous entertain to moral evil. \Ve by no means assert that this consideration is the sole foundation of the distinctions to be made between the different sour ces of human actions, and that accountableness has no meaning in itself. In the greater number of cases, the difference between voluntary and involuntary conduct is broadly marked. But wherever a difficulty exists, the principles of utility, and a reference to the ultimate con sequences of our decision on the safety of social life, afford the surest aid.—Wherever a due degree of attention has been paid to the aberrations of the human mind, by the parties called on to give their decision before a man is to be treated as insane, and wherever the whole proceedings are subjected to a fair degree of publicity, we have little to apprehend, in an intelligent state of society, from the mere difficulty of the subject. It is from inconsiderate ness, rudeness, the toleration of low mercenary motives, the avoidance of a duty foolishly reckoned disagreeable, the unnatural combinations which the false pride of some leads them to form with others who are actuated by the worst motives to cultivate a policy of unmanly conceal ment, that the most lamentable abuses on tire subject of in sanity have derived their origin. But it is one of the most animating features of the present age, to find the general mind rising superior to such negligence and mistake. \Ve may probably hail this improvement as a precursor of a sounder mode of thinking on all subjects, and the disap pearance of some of the most prevalent moral causes of insanity. To know our duties to those who are really insane, is to be farther removed from a tendency to a participation in their malady, than we should other wise be.