We arc now arrived at the memorable xra in Mar11)6 rough's life, when the command of the allied forces, and the management of our foreign alliances, were vested in his person. This took place in the beginning of 1702, when he was in his 52d year, possessing the frill advan tage of matured experience, without any loss of consti tutional actin icy. The unlimited favour of the queen, and the confidence of the allies, speedily acquired by en gaging manners and brilliant success, soon gave him a more complete controul over the military engine which he wielded than is common in a war of coalition. All this, however, was requisite ; for France, flushed with former triumphs and recent acquisitions, was on the point of giving law to Europe. Louis XIV. had reign ed forty years, and conducted three great wars, in the course of which the French armies had received hardly a single overthrow. At first he appeared to consider the campaign on the Dutch frontiers as a secondary part of the war, but Marlborough's progress soon taught him to view it in a different light. Had not the caution of the Dutch been opposed to offensive operations, there can be little doubt that the Duke, instead of merely tak ing fortified towns, and obliging the French to keep on the delensi% e during 1702 and 1703, would have accele rated the progress of the war, and inflicted on them a signal overthrow. It was not till 1704 that the Duke, being allowed to take the allied troops into Germany, and being consequently removed from unwise controul, shone forth in the true lustre of his talents. In that campaign he co-operated with Prince Eugene, with whom his uninterrupted cordiality is a circumstance highly honourable to both, and not often exemplified in military history. The victory of Blenheim was the first fruits of their harmony, and accomplished the deliverance of the emperor from imminent danger. Next year, Marlborough advanced towards the Moselle, on the plan of carrying on the war in the open country of Lorraine, and avoiding the delay' inseparable from a succession of sieges. But this bold and judicious scheme was thwart ed by the incurable slowness of the Germans, who failed in all their engagements, and made it necessary for the Duke to carry back the scene of operations into Flanders. It was on this occasion that Marshal Villars was first op posed to Marlborough. Villars was an able officer, and particularly skilful in the choice of defensive positions ; but his vanity went beyond all bounds, and he took to himself the whole credit of the Duke's retreat, though it was owing chiefly to a different cause.
The year 1706 was destined to present a very din tent spectacle. The Duke had by this time, partly by weight of reputation, partly by his persuasive powers, succeeded in prevailing on the Dutch to leave him un fettered in the command of the allied troops. Though he could not, as he once intended, proceed to Italy with a force calculated to give to affairs, in that quarter, a turn similar to that of 1704 in Germany, he found means to send a body of Prussians to reinforce Prince Eugene, and afford him the means of acting on the offensive. Tnis, along with the boldness of the Prince's tactics, led to the victory of Turin, and the deliverance of Piedmont. In the Low Countries, Marlborough signalized himself by the victory of Ramillies, a battle which, whether we consider it in itself, or in its results, was one of the most remarkable in history. It was planned altogether by himself, and was decided at a time of the clay, which left sufficient room to follow it up effectually. The conse quence was, the dispersion of the French forces, and the almost total fall of Austrian Flanders ; all this too against an enemy who had marched to attack him in the full confidence of triumph. A decisive turn was now given to the war. Louis, humbled by the loss of Piedmont and Belgium, gave over the hope of dictating laws to Europe, and began to discover a disposition to peace.
Next year, however, he threw an additional mass of force on the side of the Low Countries, which, joined to the cautious tactics of Vendosme, prevented Marlborough from making much progress. This, together with the success attendant on the French arms in Spain and in Provence, revived the hopes of that exalted people, and led, in 1708, to the resumption of offensive opera tions in Flanders. Marlborough was not long in mak ing them repent their audacity; by the victory of Ou denarde,.where daylight alone was wanting to make their loss as great as at Ramillies. Next came the siege of Lisle, au enterprise of great boldness, and prompted pro bably by Prince Eugene, who had now taken leave of Piedmont, and acted in Flanders along with Marlbo rough.
The year 1709 was remarkable for the clearly bought victory of .Malplaquet, in which the loss on both sides, in killed and wounded, was hardly short of 40,000 men. This carnarge was occasioned by the nature of the French position, which, strong in itself, had been forti fied with great care and expedition by Marshal Villars. The determination to attack it originated, there seems little doubt, with Prince Eugene. Such a measure ac corded with his bold plan of wan., and the responsibility is decidedly put on him in the book that goes by the name of his Memoirs, published in 1809, and which, whether proceeding from his pen or not, is evidently the work of a mind intimately conversant with the history of the war. The error, however, appears to have consisted, not so much in the determination to attack, as in the un fortunate delay in carrying it into effect. The allies had made a rapid and well-concerted movement for the in vestment of Mons, and Villars, commanding an equal force, set himself down in a position too near to allow of the siege being conveniently prosecuted. The move ment of Villars took place on the 9th September, on which clay, or on the next, it is generally thought the allies ought to have attacked him. But a reinforcement of 12,000 men being on the march, the battle was deferred till the morning of the llth, without considering to what account the French were likely to turn so precious an interval. Marshal Boufflers had been sent from Paris to serve along with Villars, and though a senior officer, had no objection at this critical epoch of placing himself under his orders. In the course of the action, Villars was wounded and carried off the field, a circumstance to which Inc did not fail to ascribe the loss of the day. Next year, 1710, the French, taught by past disasters, kept on the defensive, though superior in number. Marlborough and Eugene held the joint command, and took the towns of Douay, Bethune, Aloe, and St Vennut. In 1711, Eugene commanding on the Rhine, Marlborough acted alone. Villars was at the head of a very numerous ar my, and had carried his defensive labours, in the way of lines and trenches, to an extraordinary length. This, which was the last campaign of the duke of Marlbo rough, though not distinguished by any battle, is proba bly that which a tactician would mark as the most brit liant sera in his career. By a series of feints and manoeu vres, which it would greatly exceed our limits to recapi tulate, he succeeded in deceiving Villars, active and ex perienced as he was, and in entering, without the loss of a man, those lines which the Marshal had boasted would prove his ne plus ultra. This signal exploit was follow ed by the siege of Bouchain, a place of great strength, and surrounded by inundations. Villars considered his reputation at stake, and repeatedly asserted that he would force the Duke to raise the siege. He thirst not, how ever meet the Duke in a general action, and every other effort of relief was baffled by the Duke's vigilance and activity. Bouchain fell, and with its capture closed Marlborough's military career.