3. Of what use, then, is a principle which it may be often difficult to discover, and which is always liable to be misunderstood or perverted by those who stand most in need of the restraints of law ? The principle itself, we an swer, is not therefore the less real ; nor is it possible to dis cover any other reasonable foundation on which, on the one hand, the authority of him who issues the rule, and, on the other, the obligation to obedience of him who is to obey, can be rested. In fact, it is for the must part sufficiently obvi ous, where selfish views of an exclusive interest do not in terfere to mislead the judgment ; and bad must be that system of law, where it is not in most instances recogniza ble. Yet as it is often found, even where it is sufficiently apparent, to he of too fine or distant an application to effect popular control, other sanctions more direct and impres sive than the mere privation of the good consequent upon obedience, are commonly superinduced. In morality, the reproaches of conscience, and the disapprobation of our species, amoonting, in aggravated cases, to direct hostility, constitute this sanction ; in human institutions, it consists in the personal suffering of the offender, or the diminution of his estate by pecuniary penalties. Where the principle is less apparent, or peculiarly liable to be misapprehended or perverted, such superinduced sanction, it is obvious, be comes still more requisite to secure submission to thc rule. Yet it were absurd to regard this sanction as the test, either of the superior's right to command, or of the inferi or's obligation to obey ; since, where the principle in ques tion, that is, the good of the inferior, is altogether absent from the rule, or it may be his positive but t plainly contem plated, superinduced sanctions, and these of the severest sort, become the most indispensably necessary. Whilst, therefore, on the one hand, these superadded sanctions are necessary to secure obedience to the law, there is, on the other, no principle but the good of the inferior, by which we can measure its legitimate authority. Undoubtedly, where its enactments are on the whole beneficial, a wise people will, for the sake of the general system, yield their obedience, even in those cases where their good is obviously not contemplated; nor, whether prospective reasoning be consulted, or the actual experience of nations, will they withhold their submission, until, by an honest and accurate estimate of all the tremendous consequences of revolution, they plainly perceive a preponderance of advantage as the result.
4. From the various relations in which the human spe cies is placed, arise various classes or denominations of law; some more, others less general : As, First, From the relation in which man stands to the De ity, arises religion, or the divine law. comprehending those duties which, as a creature variously endowed, he owes to the Creator, from whom these endowments proceed. Pos sessing life, reason, moral perception, the affections of the beam, and all the other sources of enjoyment incident to his condition, he recognises the duty of gratitude, as at once founded in natural sentiment, and demanded by its own reasonableness. Possessing intelligence, by which lie de rives a glimpse of that infinite wisdom and power which appear to pervade creation, he in the same manner acknow ledges at once the sentiment and the duty of adoration. Dependent from day to day for every good he enjoys, and conscious of the ennobling influence of communion with a Being so holy, so beneficent, so powerful, he feels his obli gation to prayer, and delights in the exercise of it. Per ceiving, in fine, that what are usually called the evils of life cannot, consistently with the notions of perfection which he is forced from every consideration to form of the divine nature, be otherwise regarded than as ultimately connected with a scheme of infinite beneficence ; and awaiting, upon grounds of the highest reason, an immortality beyond the present existence, where the perfect wisdom of that scheme shall be fully disclosed, he recognizes the duty of resigna tion, and derives from the practice of it a support and satis faction infinitely beyond the reach of any philosophical pre cepts unconnected with that principle. Thus, from the
various points of relation between man and his Creator, may be deduced the various duties of religion, or those divine laws which the Deity has made it at once the duty and the happiness of all his rational creatures to observe.
But to these obligations, which are common to all the species, being the duties of mere natural religion, the doc trines and duties of revealed religion are to be superadded, which, as Christians, we are in like manner bound to be lieve and practise.
Second, From the relation in which, as partaking of one common nature, the different individuals of the species, under whatever government or in whatever region of the globe they may be placed, stand to one another, arise the obligations of morality, or ethics. Hence the duty of bene volence, or an affectionate desire of the happiness of all men, prompting us to the actual performance of every kind office within our poNver. Hence likewise the obliga tions ofjustice, truth, candour, and all t he other duties which form the proper subject of the moralist.
Third, From the relation subsisting between men as con stituting different nations, communities, or bodies politic, is derived international law, or as it is usually, though less accurately called, the law of nations ; of which we are ;Afterwards to treat more at large.
Fourth, From the relation subsisting between the diffe rent individuals who compose one nation, or community, arises civil, or municipal law ; being that body of rules which, issuing from a supreme authority, duly constituted by national consent, direct or implied, are obligatory on each individual alike, for the good of all. Thus. there are as many separate systems of civil or municipal law as there are separate and independent communities, for no people can exist in a state of union without a system of rules of some sort or another, by which their transactions and con duct may be more or less regulated and controlled.
5. Each of these general departments, or sorts of law, may again be divided into distinct subordinate branches, ac cording to the subject or class of circumstances to which they more immediately refer. Thus, civil law may 'be divided into political law, which relates to the principles of the constitution of the state, and the rights and duties of the governors and governed relatively to one another;— into criminal law, which refers to the moral conduct of the citizens, in cases of such atrocity as are thought to affect the general peace and welfare of the community ;—into ec clesiastical law, which relates more immediately to the police of religion, and the rights of the church and its functionaries ;—into civil law, in a restricted sense of the word, or those rules which, in contradistinction to ec clesiastical, criminal, and other branches of the municipal code, refer to contracts, succession, &c.;—into the law of process, comprehending the structure of courts of law, and the various modes, adapted to various circumstances, by which civil suits as well as criminal procedure must he conducted. And so of the other general departments of law.