We readily grant, that nittaphy sics have often been grossly abused; they have been disgraced ny the un cow h and fat tactic dress in which they have been ex hibited, or by the p. rverted purposes to which they have been directed ; tney have ixen rendered contemp tible by the quibbling o the schooltlicia and by the so phistry and scepticism of Ilobbes, Spinosa, and Hume ; and we may justly di sp.tir of redeeming their a redit with those, who argue Lganist the g• Detail use of any thing ft on) its occasional abuse Such persons might argue against the benefit ol the solar heat, hi cause it is often the cause of p.stitenre at.d disease. Bu we are firmly convinced, that in proportion as intellte to I or metaphysical studies are neglected, taste w ill degene rate, and the general energy or mind will be impaired. That man is a genuine metaphysician, who dives into the nature of things, who methodizes seemingly al10• malous facts, and reduces to simple and perspicuous ruts s, those appearances which present to others no thing hut a mass of disjointed and incongruous mate rials : the man who does this is a benefactor of the hu man species, and his memory will be honoured as such, while the names of the grovelling herd, who laugi ed at his pursuits, will be covered with sudden and ever lasting oblivion.
How would those who pretend to despise metaphy sics have been able to stand before the acuteness of the celebrated sceptics. whose names have been already mentioned ? It was necessary that such men as Locke and Berkeley should oppose the dangerous doctrines of Hobbes and Spinosa, on politics, morals, and religion ; and that such men as Reid, Campbell, and Stewart, should encounter the dangerous sophistry of Hume. If it should be said, that an instrument so convertible to the best or worst of purposes, had better be kept out of the hands of the generality of men, this is as much as to say, that the potter of reason should never be exercised, because it is equally the means of disse minating truth. and of giving currency to error. If any evil consequences have ever resulted Irom metaphy sical discussions, it is only a farther illustration of what has generally been regarded as an axiom, that the cor ruption of the best things produces the worst effects. Whatever has much power to do good must, if abused, have much power to do mischief; and if metaphysics have occasionally been employed to unhinge belief, or to unsettle the foundations of virtue, it should be re membered, that we derive the means of cure from the same source, and employ the same, instruments, but differently handled and applied, to erect the temples of truth, happiness, and virtue.
If mankind knew hut where to stop in their re searches, metaphysics would appear the most useful, as well as the most sublime science that ever engaged the faculties of the human mind. But they are often brought into discredit, not through any inherent defect in themselves, hut from the restless and insatiable de sire of the in.nd to comprehend all mysteries and all knowledge. As this attempt must necessarily prove unsuccessful, we may expect to see the blame laid on the science, wide') has been employed as the means of investigation. Let man be blamed for attempting im
possibilities ; but let the science he respected, which will carry him as far as he can go with pleasure and with safety.
Let all the absurdities, then. that have ever proceed ed front the brain of a bewildered or sceptical metaphy sician, be mustered up to sus' sin the arraignment against the utility of ontological science, the whole host must instantly give way, before the immortal works which hive pm them down, by the judicious application of the same principles which less sober or less virtuous men had abused. Is it not in the highest degree ungene rous, then, to remember only the evils which the abuse of the science has produced, without acknowledging the benefits which it has conferred, and feeling grate ful lbr having laid the sure foundations of taste, reason ing, and knowledge ? No man will doubt the utility ol metaphysical studies. woo knows any thing about them, and who is disposed to conduct his researches with that coolness, and philosophic caution, which is necessary to ensure success in any investigation. Lat no one, then, be deterred from entering on this study by the outcries of ignorance or prejudit e ; or by the misrepresentations of those who rail at what they do not understand. Sicut canrs wnotos scraper allatrant. Lat those abstain from metaphysics who think that they never ought to grapple with any thing that is pro found : let those avoid them, who think that there is no knowledge but what is apprehended by tne outward senses : but let those continue to maintain the honour of the who wish to explore the recesses and resources of their own minds, who seek to be acquaint ed with the nature and essential qualities of things. or who wish to know any thing of substance, its attri butes, and its adjuncts.
Untie anima, atque animi constet natura, videndum, Qua font ratione et qua vi quxquegerantur In te•ris.
But we admit that metaphysics have not only been abused by faulty investigations and unwarranted as sumptions, they have also frequently been brought into disrepute by the ridiculous pretensions of some of their advocates. Were we to give credit to Mr. H ir ris or Lord Monlandclo, we should scarcely believe mat a man could he confident of the number of his own fingers, unless he w ere instructed in the metaphysics of Aristotle. What can be more puerile than the observa tions of the Scottish senator, when he says, that "a mechanic who applies a foot or a yard to the length of two bodies, and finds that both agree exactly to that measure, and are neither longer nor shorter, can give no reason why he believes the bodies to he of equal length, not knowing the axiom of Euclid, that two things which are equal to a third thing, are equal to one another ?" (?indent Metaphysics, vol. v p 154 ) Is it not evident, that the mechanic knew the axiom as well as Euclid, and could give just as good an account of it ? When he knows the fact he knows the axiom ; and he knows, with infallible certainty, that what he has observed in one measurement is applicable to all similar ones ; he, therefore, instantly and intuitively adopts the fact as a general principle of knowledge.