Meanwhile, a new kingdom was formed on the banks of the Oder and the Spree, whose sovereigns having nei ther commerce nor maritime power, devoted themselves to the creation of a formidable military force, _which should enable them to assume an imposing attitude among the European powers. Frederick II. completed the plan which had been chalked out by his predeces sors. He not only doubled the number of his troops, but improved their discipline, and invented a system of tactics almost entirely new. He was perfectly well ac quainted with the state of the military art among the ancients, and employed his genius in discovering and bringing to perfection such manoeuvres as were best adapted to modern warefare. His efforts were amply rewarded by his first successes in the field. But even during peace these efforts were riot relaxed. Ile form ed camps at Spandau and at ilagdeburgh ; exercised his troops continually in the most scientific and effec tive movements; rectified whatever experience shelved to be defective ; and introduced an incredible degree of decision and celerity in the execution of all the neces sary manoeuvres.
During the seven years' war the efficacy of discip line and tactics, under the conduct of genius, was fully evinced. In the war of manoeuvres, as may easily be conceived, the king of Prussia was eminently success ful. He was frequently defeated in pitched battles ; but he seemed to rise, like Atrzeus from the earth, with fresh vigour and renewed courage; and it was remark ed that he never was more formidable than when his enemies believed him to have been effectually crushed. Such was the state of discipline to which he brought the Prussian troops, that they frequently made forced marches, lost a battle, left behind them the greater part of their cannon, and took up a position at the distance of a couple of leagues from the field where they had been defeated.
But the merit of the king of Prussia does not rest en tirely on the improved discipline of his troops ; his ge nius was equally occupied with the scientific principles of military movements ; and the Prussian tactics have accordingly been considered as forming an xra in mili tary history. Frederick strewed that the movements of en army of 100,000 men may be reduced to rules as simple as those of an army of 10,000 ; and that having once dis covered the spring which regulates the movements of a single battalion, it is only necessary to combine a number of these springs, and to handle them with skill. He has been considered as the real inventor of light, or flying artillery ; but his inventive genius chiefly distinguished itself by his improvement of the oblique or angular or der of battle, the principles of which he studied pro foundly, and carefully explained its mechanism to his generals.
From the time of Frederick, it does not appear to us that any very important improvements have been made in military tactics. During the late wars, indeed, the French adopted a mode of fighting in some respects new ; but this was a necessary consequence of the cha racter of their troops, and their imperfect state of disci pline. Instead of lines, that could with difficulty be pre served in the face of an enemy superior in discipline to themselves, they formed close columns. Their battles also were reduced to attacks on certain points, and sometimes on one only. By brigades constantly suc ceeding each other, and fresh troops supplying the place of those who had been driven back, they general ly succeeded ultimately in forcing the point attacked. In their movements, whatever was lost in regularity and precision, was amply compensated by increased ve locity. To •the rapidity, indeed, with which their movements were executed, they were indebted for much of their success. They also derived great advantage from the employment of numerous bodies of light troops of various descriptions, and the improved and extended use of flying artillery. In their battles, too, they generally kept a large body of reserve, composed of the best troops, and commanded by an able general, which, on more than one occasion, was the means of recovering a battle which was considered as lost.
The French likewise introduced considerable changes in the subordinate arrangements of the army during a campaign. Their wants were supplied by requisition ; and when they entered a country they had little or no baggage. By abandoning the old system of forming depots and magazines, they certainly exposed their troops to famine, want, and disorder ; but, with all these inconveniences, they appear to have reaped very important advantages from this mode of supplying their armies. Their movements could not be anticipated from the magazines they had formed, and the position of their depots ; and their route was not liable to be re tarded by the attention which it would have been ne cessary to pay to these objects. The inroads of the French armies, therefore, were unexpected, and their progress rapid. They calculated only upon success ; and they generally obtained it by the celerity of their movements, and the boldness and enterprise of their plans. At the same time it must be observed, that as they generally put every thing to hazard, and neglected or despised those precautions which frequently mitigate the consequences of bad success, their defeats were al