NOUNS are either concrete or abstract. A concrete noun signifies a congeries of qualities habitually presented to gether in nature. An abstract noun signifies a quality se parately conceived.
The words " man," " woman," " wood," " stone," " house," " city," are examples of concrete nouns. They are the same that have been considered by grammarians and metaphysicians as the names of substances, that is, of subtrata possessing definite qualities. The qualities and the substances have been supposed to be firmly conjoined ; hence the name concrete, by which their nature is express ed, is derived from Latin words con and cretus, signify ing " grown together." Though the hypothesis of a sub stratum is rejected, the term concrete is perfectly well adapted to represent a congeries of qualities which have become associated in the mind, in consequence of certain specimens of them in nature being habitually found in con junction. The name of a person well known to us sug gests some or all of the qualities by which he is distin guished, such as his appearance, the sound of his voice, and the particulars of his personal character. The name of any well-known river, hamlet, field, or other inanimate object, suggests, in like manner, the distinguishing charac ters of each. The same thing is even done, though in a different way, by concrete terms of more general applica tion, such as the words " river," " mountain," and " city." Sometimes one quality of the object, and sometimes seve ral, occur to the mind as associated with the word ; some times merely a vague impression of a scene, in which we expect to find certain qualities which are the objects of our remembrance. The limits within which the expecta tions connected with words of this sort are confined consti tute their precise meaning, or mental definition.
The scene by which we are continually surrounded con sists of groups of sensible qualities, which are various in extent, and variously combined. This diversity gives ori gin to a diversity of terms. Terms arc rendered necessa ry on account of the subserviency of many surrounding objects to our first wants, and their importance as instru ments of mutual assistance among men. When they arc present, we may, by merely looking or pointing at them, direct to them the attention of one another, and, when they are absent, we may think of them independently of any names. But, when one man wishes to execute any pur pose regarding them in their absence by exciting the ideas of them in the mind of another, he requires signs to represent them ; and from the familiarity of the mind with these objects, the contrivance of names becomes a very early operation of the social individual.
.4bstract nouns are those which signify qualities sepa rately conceived, such as " whiteness," " roundness," " softness," " form," " magnitude," ‘, beauty." The na ture of these nouns, and of the objects which they desig nate, has given rise to controversy. Some have denied that they express definite or separate ideas, because quali ties never exist by themselves, but are always attached to some substance ; and because it is impossible even to think of the qualities without thinking of the substance. It has, for example, been declared impossible to think of whiteness, blackness, redness, straightness, or hardness, without thinking of a thing or substance which is white, black, red, straight or hard. In so far as this doctrine im plies the impossibility of thinking of qualities without the substrata, it has been already discussed, and must be laid aside by every person who recollects that the substratum is regarded, even by those who believe most firmly in its existence, as the most difficult to be apprehended of all material objects. Those who imagine that they think
about substances to which such qualities as have now been mentioned belong, merely think more or less obscurely of other qualities with which they have a strong inclination to connect those which happen to be named. Each quality is an independent object of knowledge : but the ideas of different qualities are strongly associated in the mind, and the activity and versatility of its operations produce a proneness to conjoin each one that comes into view with others conceived to be collateral. During the first evolu tion of our senses, our knowledge is acquired by attending to single qualities. Persons who are born blind or deaf, and consequently have none of the ideas imparted by that sense which is deficient to mingle with their other ideas, retain through life a separate conception of certain mate rial qualities which, by the greater part of mankind, are constantly associated with others. When a person, un der these circumstances, happens fo recover the defici ent faculty, the ideas which it conveys are at first separate, and it is only by experience that the habit of associating :hem with others is gradually produced. This process has been illustrated in the history of persons born blind from an opacity in the crystalline lens of the eye, and cured by a surgical operation, at a period of life when their men tal faculties were so far unfolded as to enable them to de scribe their sensations. In mankind at large, the combina tions of sensible ideas are formed long before language is attended to ; and on this account the structure of language affords no analytical view of the process. If it did, the [lames of single qualities would be the simplest words, and the names of the assemblages which we denominate matter or substance would be comparatively compound. The re verse of this is the case. The names of habitual assem blages of objects are less compound, because the utility of assigning names to them is of prior suggestion. Single qualities are later in becoming leading subjects of dis course, and hence their names are later in assuming the form of substantive nouns. " Whiteness," " blackness," 44 red " hardness," a straightness," " roundness," are not so short as many names of objects, which comprehend one of these qualities in combination with several others. " Egg" is a shorter word than " whiteness," " soot" than " black ness." Even the names of single qualities comprehend, in their original formation, a general mark of reference to some congeries of which they are supposed to form a part, and the name is subordinate in discourse to the name of some such congeries. " White" is the name of a quality, and contains a reference to some congeries to which it is described as belonging. The separate consideration of the quality is a subsequent object of interest ; therefore the term for it is of subsequent creation, and an additional sign to denote this separate consideration is attached to it. This sign is the termination 44 ness." From " white," we have " whiteness ;" from 44 red," 44 redness;" from " round," " roundness ;" from 44 great," " greatness." Different languages have different terminations adapted to the same purpose. From the Latin magnus, we have magnitudo in Latin, and 44 magnitude" in English.