We have recognised but a single source of wealth, which is labour; yet we have not recognised but a single class of citizens, to whom the revenues produced by labour be long. These are distributed among all the classes of the nation; they assume all manner of forms, and, therefore, it is just that taxation should follow them into all their ramifications. Taxation ought to he considered by the ci tizens of a state as a recompense for the protection, which government grants to their persons and properties. It is just that all support this, in proportion to the advantages secured them by society, and to the expenses it incurs for them. The greater part of the charge arising from social establishments, is destined to defend the rich against the poor ; because, if left to their respective strength, the former would very speedily be stripped. It is hence just that the rich man contribute not only in proportion to his fortune, but even beyond it, to support a system which is so advantageous to hint ; in the same way as it is equita ble to take from his superfluity rather than from the other's necessaries. Most public labours, most charges for de fence and for the administration of justice, have territorial rather than movable property in view; it is hence farther just, that the landed proprietor be taxed in proportion higher than others.
After the sources of income have become various, it can not be supposed that a single tax will reach them all, un less it assume as a basis this income itself, the valuation of which, in any form, would give room to the most arbitrary and vexatious inquisitions. The tax, though single, would in that case lose all the advantages of simplicity. It was
better then, for contributors, as well as for government, to multiply taxes, that each by itself might be lighter, and the whole might better reach every class of persons. Govern ments have therefore multiplied partial taxes. They have taken wherever they have found any thing to take ; and though flattering themselves with having thus reached all their subjects, it would be impossible for them to appreci ate how much is asked of each class, and consequently to maintain the proportional equality which justice would have required. On the other hand, contributors like bet ter to submit to this heavy inconvenience, than to the ob ligations of exhibiting an account of their incomes, which often they do not know themselves, and to a division on arbitrary grounds, which most frequenly would be intoler able.
In establishing those different taxes, four rules appear of essential importance for rendering each tax as little bur densome as possible. Each citizen must contribute, if he can do so, according to the proportion of his fortune ; the collection must not be expensive, that so the tax may cost as little to the people as possible beyond what it brings into the treasury ; the term of payment must be suitable to the contributor, who might frequently be ruined by an unrea sonable demand of what he could pay, without constraint, if his convenience were consulted ; and, finally, the citi zen's liberty must be respected, that so he may not be ex posed otherwise, than with extreme caution, to the inspec tion of revenue•offieers, to the dependent, and all the vexatious measures too often connected with the levying