All the means necessary io the reduction of a fortress are justified by the laws of war ; consequently there are cases which may authorize the demolition or burning of the suburbs. But, except in cases of necessity, it is now ad mitted that the besiegers ought to direct their artillery against the fortifications only, and not intentionally against the public edifices, or any other buildings, either within or without the ramparts 10. If a fortress or fortified town surrenders by capitu lation, on that capitulation depends the f to of the gar rison, arms, warlike stores, and ol the inhabitants and their property.
Tne terms of a capitulation depend entirely on circum stances ; they are usually 'Lore or less honourable, as the situation of the besieged is more or less favourable ; hut if the place, after being duly summoned, refuses to sur render and is taken by assault, those found in it are obliged to submit to the discretion of the victor. All that tie garrison can expect is to have their lives spared if they immediately lay down their arms. It is however custo mary lor the victor to forbid pillage on such occasions.
1. The belligerent powers often enter into conventions, either at the begining or in the course of the war. By these conventions they promise not to make use of such or such arms, or such or such means of injuring each other ; settle the conditions and the manner to be observed in the exchange or redemption of prisoners of make arrangements relative to passports, safe con ducts, Sec. adjust the terms of a truce, Ste.
2. As a security for the fulfilment of conventions made in the course of the war, it is still customary to place hostages in the hands of the party who would suffer by a non-fulfilment. If the other party breaks his engage ments, it is allowable to treat his hostages with severity, but not to take their lives, unless for some crime that they have committed, or by way of retaliation.
1. A sovereign may be obliged to join his forces to those of another power, sometimes in fulfilment of his treaties of alliance, and sometimes in consequence of a particular connection existing between him and such pow er; or he may do it from his own choice. In none of these cases does he act against the law of nations, if the cause he espouses be not unjust. To a sovereign so situated there result two sorts of rights and obligations ; first, Relative to the power whom he assists ; second, Relative to the enemies of that power.
2. Alliances are simply defensive, or they are offensive at the same time. An alliance is simply defensive, when the allies promise to assist each other in case either should be attacked first, or be in danger of an attack by some other power ; it is offensive and defensive, when they promise to assist each other, not only in case of a first at tack, but even should either of them make the first attack on some other power.
Both sorts of alliances are either general or particu lar. They are general when they extend to all wars in which either of the allies may be engaged ; and particular when directed against a particular power, or confined to a particular war.
Alliances are formed sometimes before, and sometimes after, the beginning of a war. As to their duration, it is sometimes for a definite, and sometimes for an indefinite space of time, and sometimes for ever. The allies either promise a specific number of troops, or vessels, or of both ; or they promise a certain aid in money ; or to assist each other with all their forces ; or finally to make com mon cause.
3. Simple treaties of subsidy must be distinguished from alliances. A treaty of subsidy is a convention by which one power engages, in consideration of a certain sum of mo ney, to bring into the field a specific number of troops, Sze. to be in the pay and service of another power. The time for which such troops are to remain in service is sometimes determinate, and sometimes not.
A power often receives a subsidy in consideration of engaging to keep a certain number of troops, &c. in readiness of service, and sometimes of engaging only to augment its own forces.
4. Strictly speaking, a belligerent power has a right to treat as his enemies all the powers who lend assistance to the enemy, from whatever motive, or in consequence of whatever treaty. Policy,however, has induced the powers of Europe to depart from this rigorous principle. They now admit, first, That a sovereign who furnishes troops, in virtue of a treaty of subsidy, does not therchy become the enemy of the power against which those troops act : second, That as long as a sovereign sends to the assistance of his ally no more than the number of troops, &c. stipulat ed in the treaty of alliance, and does not authorize them to serve upon any other footing than that specified in the treaty, such sovereign ought to he looked upon as an auxiliary, and not as the enemy of the power against which his troops make war ; and, of course, that such sovereign ought to be permitted to enjoy his rights of neutrality. This is more especially the case, when the aid of an aux iliary is the consequence of a treaty of general defensive alliance, concluded before the beginning of the war.